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CONTRACTS--1957 TENNESSEE SURVEY
PAUL J. HARTMAN*
DAmAGES

Breach of contract to publish advertisement--certaintyof lost anticipated profits-nominal damages: The rule of "certainty" with respect
to awarding damages for a breach of contract is simply a standard requiring a reasonable degree of persuasiveness in the proof of the fact
of damage and of the amount of damage.' Through the use of the
standard of certainty, the court is enabled to insist that the jury must
have factual data-something more than guesswork-to guide them
in fixing the award.2 Loss of commercial profits, claimed as damages
for breach of contract, has become the principal field for the application
of the standard of certainty. 3
In cases of breach of contract for advertising, the claim for loss of
profits has often failed because too uncertain. Profit on new business
which might have been drawn to the advertiser usually has been
disallowed because the evidence that is introduced to prove that such
profits would have been made if the defendant had not committed
the breach of contract is usually thought to be too speculative and
4
uncertain to allow the anticipated profits as an element of damage.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals case of Morristown Lincoln-Mercury,
Inc. v. Roy N. Lotspeich Publishing Co. 5 is illustrative of this position.
There plaintiff, a car dealer, sued the defendant, a newspaper publisher, for breach of contract to publish advertisement of sale of new
and used automobiles, claiming as damages anticipated profits lost by
refusal of the defendant to publish the advertisement. In the trial
court, plaintiff recovered a judgment for $3,000. On appeal, the court
of appeals held that the proof was not sufficiently certain to establish
actual damages for loss of profits, but permitted plaintiff to recover
nominal damages in the amount of $300.
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University; Member, Tennessee Bar.
1. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1022 (1951); McCoRmiCK, DAMAGES § 26 (1935);

15 AM. JuR., Damages §§ 20, 150 (1938).
2. See Central Coal & Coke Co. v. Hartman, 111 Fed. 96 (8th Cir: 1901);

Broadway Photoplay Co. v. World Film Corp., 225 N.Y. 104, 121 N.E. 756

(1919); Macan v. Scandanavia Belting Co., 264 Pa. 384, 107 Atl. 750 (1919);
5 Co BIN, CONTRACTS § 1022 (1951); McCoRmIcK, DAMAGES § 26 (1935).
3. See MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 28 (1935); 15 Am. JuR., Damages §§ 152, 153
(1938); Annot., 32 A.L.R.2d 582, 606 (1953). For methods of proving prospective
profits, see 5 WILLIsTON, CONTRACTS § 1346A (rev. ed. 1937).
4. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 30 (1935); Annot., 41 A.L.R. 198, 204 (1926)

(collection of cases in some of which recovery allowed and in others of which
recovery denied). See 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1022 (1951) for a very lucid
discussion of the meaning of "speculative and uncertain profits."
5. 298 S.W.2d 788 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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Plaintiff's proof with respect to loss of profits flowing from the
breach of its advertisement contract was meager. Plaintiff's only
witness testified that as a result of the breach plaintiff canceled an
order for 20 new cars, which he expected to sell as a result of the
advertisement and on which he said plaintiff might have made an average profit of $400 or $500 per car, if he had sold them. The witness
also testified that plaintiff expected to sell forty or fifty cars on the
strength of the advertisement.
Under all the facts appearing, the court felt that the anticipated
profits from the contract to publish advertisements were not sufficiently proved as a proper element of damages. The evidence presented
left uncertain whether or not plaintiff would have made a profit as a
result of this advertisement campaign. The court was thus of the opinion that plaintiff's estimate of damages suffered was mere speculation.
Hence it concluded that plaintiff had not proved its alleged damages
(loss of profits) with reasonable certainty.
In proving a claim for loss of profits, the opinions of witnesses as to
the amount of profit that would have been gained under a particular
contract are not admissible, except where the opinion is that of an
expert based on relevant facts. 6 In the case at hand it was neither
shown that plaintiff's witness was an expert nor were any relevant
facts presented on which an opinion could be based.
In a few cases of breach of contract for advertising and similar trade
stimuli the plaintiff-advertiser has been able to satisfy the requirement of certainty with respect to the profits he would have made from
the publicity. The special circumstances of particular cases have enabled the plaintiff to establish a definite loss of profits.7 However,
claims for loss of anticipated profits for breach of an advertising contract, especially in new business, usually have found the certainty
obstacle too large to surmount; 8 and the case at hand was no exception.
The Court of Appeals did, however, hold that plaintiff-advertiser
was entitled to nominal damages for breach of contract and fixed the
amount at $300. Nominal damages for a breach of contract may be
awarded where a plaintiff has failed to prove actual damages, although
the proof entirely fails to show that the breach was accompanied by
6. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 29 (1935).

7. E.g., Gagnon v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 206 Mass. 547, 92 N.E. 761
(1910). There the defendant's breach was a failure to furnish trading stamps

after supplying them for a short time. Proof of the rise and fall of plaintiff's
business before, during and after the time when the stamps were furnished
was held to be sufficient. See also Marcus v. Myers, 11 L.T.R. 327 (1895).
For a discussion of these cases, see Annot., 41 A.L.R. 198, 205 (1926).
8. Tribune Co. v. Bradshaw, 20 Ill. App. 17 (1886); Stevens v. Yale, 113
Mich. 680, 72 N.W. 5 (1897); Winston Cigarette Mach. Co. v. Wells-Whitehead
Tobacco Co., 141 N.C. 284, 53 N.E. 885 (1906); North Star Trading Co. v.
Alaska-Yukon-Pacific Exposition, 68 Wash. 457, 123 Pac. 605 (1912). For a
discussion of these cases see Annot., 41 A.L.R. 198, 203 (1926).
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any injurious consequences to the plaintiff. 9 Nominal damages in a
trivial amount may thus be awarded for the breach merely as a recognition of some breach of duty owed by defendant to plaintiff, but
such damages are not given as a measure of recompense for loss or
detriment sustained.1 0 Nominal damages are usually fixed at one cent,
one dollar, or some similar small amount." They are thus clearly distinguished from similar sums awarded as compensation for small
losses actually suffered. 12 The $300 nominal damages awarded in the
case at hand seem at variance with the generally accepted practice
which would consider as "nominal" only an amount such as a few
dollars or a few cents.13 But then maybe the concept of "nominal
damages" also has been caught up in the inflation spiral.
Breach of Contract To Sell-Recovery of Resale Profits: What is the
measure of damages when the defendant-seller refuses to deliver lumber to the plaintiff-buyer, a lumber dealer, and there is no available
market elsewhere from which the buyer can obtain lumber to fill his
resale orders? That was the question before the Tennessee Supreme
Court in Jennings v. Lamb.14
The defendant (Lamb) had agreed to sell a certain amount of lumber
at a list of fixed prices to plaintiff (Jennings) who was an established
dealer in finishing and selling rough lumber. Defendant apparently
knew that plaintiff was such a dealer. Defendant delivered some lumber to plaintiff under his contract and then defaulted in his contractual
obligations by delivering to plaintiff only about half the board feet
of lumber called for in the contract. A scarcity of lumber developed
in the area and plaintiff was not able to buy on the open market
lumber with which to fill his orders. There is a disagreement between
the trial court and the court of appeals on the one hand and the Supreme Court on the other as to whether plaintiff could have sold all
the lumber which defendant had contracted to deliver to plaintiff.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court was satisfied that the uncontradicted,
clear, positive testimony showed that plaintiff could have sold all the
9. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 22 (1935); 15 Am. JuR., Damages §§ 5-6 (1938).
That a party's recovery of nominal damages is unaffected by the fact that he

was benefitted by the breach is generally accepted. Oklahoma Natural Gas
Corp. v. Municipal Gas Co., 113 F.2d 308 (10th Cir. 1940).
10. 5 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1001 (1951); MCCORMICK, DAMAGES §§ 20-21
(1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1339A (rev. ed. 1937); 15 Am. JuR., Damages
§ 356 (1938).
11. 5 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1001 (1951); MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 21 (1935);
15 Am. JUR., Damages § 5 (1938).
12. McCoRMICK, DAMAGES § 21 (1935); 15 Amv. JuR., Damages § 5 (1938).

13. McCoRMIcK, DAMAGES § 21 (1935). A judgment for $200 is not for
nominal damages, but for substantial damages. Mahoney v. Beatman, 110
Conn. 184, 147 Atl. 762, 66 A.L.R. 1121 (1929). In Broads v. Mead, 159 Cal. 765,
116 Pac. 46 (1911), where plaintiff was entitled to only nominal damages,
judgment for $100 was reduced on appeal to $1.00. See also 15 AM. JR.,
Damages § 5 (1938).
14. 296 S.W.2d 828 (Tenn. 1956).
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lumber in the regular course of trade, although plaintiff did not show
that he had firm orders for all the lumber.
The specific question before the courts was whether plaintiff could
recover, as an element of damages for breach of contract, loss of
anticipated profits on all the lumber defendant did not deliver. In
reversing both lower courts the Supreme Court held that plaintiff
could recover such profits.
There are several factors relied on by the court in permitting plaintiff-buyer to recover the lost profits as an element of damages. Plaintiff had an established business and the evidence showed that he could
have sold all the lumber in question at the profit claimed, although
plaintiff did not have firm orders for all the lumber. Defendant also
knew that plaintiff was a lumber dealer and presumably would resell
the lumber. Moreover, it should also be pointed out-although the
fact was not seemingly relied on by the court as a basis for its decision-that plaintiff was not able to buy other lumber on the open
market to fill his orders because a scarcity of lumber had developed in
the area.
Section 67 of the Uniform Sales Act, adopted in Tennessee,15 prescribes rules for measuring damages for breach of contract where a
seller fails to fulfill his promise to deliver goods. Section 67 (3) takes
care of the ordinary situation and expresses the general rule for
measuring the damages the buyer can properly recover. It provides
that if, at the time of the breach, there is an "available market" in
which the buyer can obtain the goods, then his measure of damages,
in the absence of "special circumstances" showing greater damages,
is the difference between the market price and the contract price. If
a market is available to the buyer in which he can buy other goods
like those promised by the seller, the buyer is made whole if he is
awarded the market value at the time and place fixed for delivery, less
any unpaid part of the contract price. 16 So, where such market exists
and no "special circumstances" are shown which resulted in a greater
loss, the standard just stated is the measure of the buyer's damages.17
However, where there is no available market, or where there are
"special circumstances" showing damages of a greater amount, the
15. TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 47-1201 to -1277 (1956). This is a codification in
essence, of the common law. See Memphis Casting Works, Inc. v. Bearings &
Transmission Co., 35 Tenn. App. 164, 243 S.W.2d 145 (W.S. 1951); McCoRMICK,
DAMAGES § 657 (1935). The Uniform Sales Act has been adopted in 33 states.

See 1A UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 6 (1956 Supp.) for the states that have adopted
it, with the effective date of the Act in each state.
16. See e.g., 46 AM. JuR., Sales §§ 677, 689 (1950).
17. See Black v. Love & Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn. App. 377, 383-84, 206
S.W.2d 432, 434-35 (M.S. 1947); Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. International
Agricultural Corp., 146 Tenn. 451, 463-64, 243 S.W. 81, 85-86 (1922); McCORMvICK, DAMAGES § 175 (1935); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1383 (rev. ed,
1938).
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damages must be determined in some other manner. The Uniform
Sales Act leaves the rules for assessing damages rather flexible in
situations in which there is no available market, or where there are
"special circumstances showing proximate damages of a greater
amount" than the differences between the contract price and the
market price. The only relevant guide is in section 67(2) of the
Uniform Sales Act which provides that the measure of damages "is
the loss directly and naturally resulting in the ordinary course of
events from the seller's breach of contract."' 8
Thus, in measuring the buyer's damages when the available market
test can not be satisfactorily used, there are two variables which must
be reckoned with, namely: (1) the lack of an "available market"; and
(2) "special circumstances" which make it inequitable to use the
gauge of the difference between the contract price and the market
price.
Where the buyer can show lack of an available market, or where
he can show "special circumstances," he may be able to recover as
special damages the profits he would have made according to the
contract. Under what circumstances can the buyer recover lost profits?
Under some circumstances the buyer may recover his lost profits
when it can be shown that the buyer intended to resell the goods which
the seller wrongfully failed to deliver and that the seller foresaw such
resale when contracting. 19 Since the buyer's claim for lost profits is
generally treated as "special" or "consequential" damages, such profits
ordinarily are not recoverable unless they were reasonably within
the contemplation of the parties at the time of the making of the
contract.20 The courts are not in agreement, however, as to exactly
what the buyer must show that the breaching seller knew about the
buyer's resales activities in order to satisfy the requirement that loss
of profits was within the contemplation of the parties. Is it enough
to show that the seller merely had knowledge at the time of the contract that the buyer was a dealer in the kind of goods purchased? Or
must the buyer show that he had a resale contract at the time of his
contract with the seller and that knowledge of the resale contract was
brought home to the seller at the time he contracted with the buyer?
The weight of authority seems to support the view that the seller's
18. See 46 Am. JUR., Sales § 683 (1950).
19. Memphis Casting Works v. Bearings & Transmission Co., 35 Tenn. App.
164, 243 S.W.2d 145 (W.S. 1951); Black v. Love & Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn.
App. 377, 206 S.W.2d 432 (M.S. 1947); See Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1439, 1445 (1934).
20. Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 255 N.Y. 33, 173
N.E. 913 (1930); Tennessee Fertilizer Co. v. International Corp., 146 Tenn. 451,
243 S.W. 81 (1922); Memphis Casting Works v. Bearings & Transmission Co.,
35 Tenn. App. 164, 243 S.W.2d 145 (W.S. 1951); Black v. Love & Amos Coal
Co., 30 Tenn. App. 377, 206 S.W.2d 432 (M.S. 1947), 20 TENN. L. REv. 385
(1948). See Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1439, 1441 (1934).
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knowledge, at the time he entered into the contract, that the buyer
was a dealer in the kind of goods purchased is sufficient to impute to
the seller notice of the fact that the goods were for resale and to charge
him, upon his breach of the sales contract, with special damages by
way of loss of profits based on the buyer's resale of the goods, although
the seller had no knowledge of any actual resale or specific customer to
21
whom the goods were to be resold.
A minority view takes the position that such special damages by
way of loss of profits resulting from the buyer's inability to complete
a resale of the goods cannot be recovered by the buyer from the seller
unless the buyer can show that there was an existing contract for
resale and that this was brought home to the seller at the time he
22
entered into the contract of sale with the buyer.
Can the buyer, by showing that the seller knew or could reasonably
have foreseen that the goods would be resold, automatically recover
lost profits, even though there was an available market in which the
buyer could have acquired the goods with which to fulfill his resale
commitments? The Uniform Sales Act speaks of "special circumstances" warranting a recovery greater than the difference between
the contract price and the market price only in connection with goods
having an available market.2 3 However, this rule which permits the
buyer to recover lost profits from the seller ordinarily would seem to
presuppose the inability of the buyer to obtain elsewhere in the market
goods with which to fulfill his resale commitments. Thus, if there is an
available market for the goods in question, rarely will the "special
circumstances" exist so as to permit the buyer to recover damages
greater than the difference between the contract price and the market
price. Ordinarily that will make the buyer whole. The Sales Act
does, however, seem to leave room for showing that "special circumstances" justify damages greater than the difference between the contract price and the market price even though there is an available
market.
After the buyer has satisfied the requirement of showing that the
seller knew enough about the buyer's resale activities to show that
loss of profits was within the contemplation of the parties and has
shown that there was no available market in which the buyer could
have replaced the goods, in order to recover lost profits, must the
21. Roberts, Wicks & Co. v. Lee, 125 Ky. 709, 102 S.W. 300 (1907): Parker v.

S. G. Shaghalian & Co., 244 Mass. 19, 138 N.E. 236 (1923); Trigg v. Clay, 88 Va.
330, 13 S.E. 434 (1891); Eureka Producing Co. v. Hoyt, 266 S.W. 203 (Tex. Civ.
App. 1924); Sedro Veneer Co. v. Kwapil, 62 Wash. 385, 113 Pac. 1100 (1911); see
Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1439, 1471 (1935); 46 Am. JuR., Sales § 699 (1950).

22. Setton v. Eberle-Albrecht Flour Co., 258 Fed. 905 (8th Cir. 1919); Foss
v. Heineman, 144 Wis. 146, 128 N.W. 881 (1910); see Annot., 88 A.L.R. 1439,
1475 (1934).
23. UNIFORM SALEs ACT § 67(3); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1267(3) (1956).
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buyer go further and show that the seller had notice that goods could
not be obtained to replace those not delivered? That is to say, in order
for the buyer to recover his lost resale profits, must he prove that the
seller, when contracting, not only knew or at least foresaw the probability that the buyer intended a resale, but also knew or at least
foresaw at the time of contracting that equivalent goods would not
later be available to the buyer in the event the seller breached his contract of sale by not delivering? Here the courts sharply divide.
As we have seen, only those damages are recoverable which are
foreseeable at the time the contract was made. This is, of course, the
almost universal rule of Hadley v. BaxendaZe.2 One special circumstance upon which that landmark case was decided was the lack of
knowledge by the breaching party, at the time of contracting, of the
unavailability to the injured party of substituted performance by
someone else. Following this approach, one view, including New York
cases, denies special damages by way of lost profits unless the seller,
at the time of contracting, not only had reason to know of the contemplated resale, but also that the seller had reason to foresee when the
contract was entered into that other goods could not be obtained by
the buyer to fill the place of those not delivered by the seller.25 Unless,
therefore, there is proof that the seller, at the time of contracting, had
notice of the contemplated resale by the buyer, as well as notice that
other goods could not be obtained by the buyer to replace those not
delivered, the courts of this persuasion say that the loss of profits
of a resale was not within the contemplation of the parties. In short,
if the loss of profits was not foreseeable when the contract was made
such loss of profits is not a proper element of damages. Prior Tennessee
caseS2 6 seem in accord with this view, and Mr. Williston's thinking is
27
also in harmony.
However, in Murarka v. Bachrack Bros., Inc.,2 the United States
24. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
25. Marcus &Co. Inc. v. K.L.G. Baking Co., 122 N.J.L. 202, 3 A.2d 627 (1939);
Czarnikow-Rionda Co. v. Federal Sugar Refining Co., 255 N.Y. 33, 173 N.E.
913 (1930); Dreyer Commission Co. v. Fruen Cereal Co., 148 Minn. 443, 182
N.W. 520 (1921); Hammond & Co. v. Bussey, [1887] 20 Q.B. 79 (C.A.).
26. Memphis Casting Works v. Bearings & Transmission Co., 35 Tenn. Aup.
164, 243 S.W.2d 145 (W.S. 1951) (loss of profits was recovered where seller

knew from the nature of the specially made goods that other like goods
could not be obtained elsewhere); Black v. Love & Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn.
App. 377, 206 S.W.2d 432 (M.S. 1947) (loss of profits recovered, where seller
should have known that no market for coal would be available elsewhere
because of shortages and war time governmental regulations).
27. See 3 WILISTON, SALES 303 (rev. ed. 1948):
"Even though no contract had yet been made by the buyer for a resale,
damages may be recovered for loss of one, if the probability of such a
resale was contemplated and the defendant knew that other goods of
the kind contracted for could not be obtained by the buyer."
See also 5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1347 (rev. ed. 1938).
28. 215 F.2d 547 (2d Cir. 1954). This case has been criticized with clarity
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Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit (purporting to apply New
York law) held that where there is no available market for goods it
is not necessary to show that the seller had notice of the buyer's actual
or contemplated resale contracts in order for the buyer to recover
damages for loss of profits. Such loss of profits are said to be general
damages when there is no available market, and knowledge of the special circumstances of a contemplated resale by the buyer need not be
brought home to the seller when he contracts with the buyer. Further
explaining the rationale of the Murarka decision, the court says that
where there is an available market and the buyer claims from the
seller loss of profits as special damages, only then must the buyer show
that the seller had notice of the buyer's actual or contemplated resale
commitments at the time- of the contract. Moreover, the Murarka
opinion does not mention a requirement, in the "no available market"
situation, that the buyer show the seller knew or at least foresaw the
probability, when contracting, that an available market where the
buyer could procure equivalent goods, in the event the seller failed
to deliver, would be lacking.2 9
Now let us see the application of some of the various relevant rules
of law which we have just examined to Jennings v. Lamb. The opinion
shows that the defendant-seller knew at the time of contracting that
the plaintiff-buyer was a dealer in lumber. By the weight of authority
that is sufficient to impute to the seller notice of the fact that the
goods were for resale and to charge him, upon breach of his contract
of sale, with special damages by way of lost profits based on the buyer's
intended resale of the goods. 30 Thus, this one facet of the foreseeability test of measuring damages was satisfied. But what about the
foreseeability by the seller, at the time of contracting, of the lack of
an available market in which the buyer could replace the goods which
the seller might fail to deliver? Although there was no available
market, as the opinion shows, when the contract was breached the
opinion does not show that the seller foresaw at the time of contracting that there might be no available market in which the buyer could
obtain lumber to replace that not delivered by the seller. The opinion
is silent on that aspect of the case. By the view supported by a great
amount of excellent authority, 31 therefore, plaintiff-buyer failed to
prove sufficient facts to justify the court in compensating him for
and vigor as erroneously interpreting the New York law. See 24 FoRDHAM
29. Bercut v. Park, Benziger & Co., 150 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1945) (applying
California law) is in accord with the Murarka case in repudiating the principle
that in order for buyer to recover profits he must prove that the seller knew
or foresaw, when contracting, that like goods would not later be available to
the buyer with which to replace those not delivered by the seller.
30. See authorities and text in connection with note 21 supra.
31. See authorities and text in connection with notes 25, 26 and 27 supra.

L. REv. 142 (1955).
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loss of anticipated profits resulting from a resale since he did not show
that the seller foresaw at the time of contracting that other lumber
of the kind contracted for could not be obtained elsewhere by the
buyer. The case at hand would not, however, be inconsistent with the
Murarka decision, which required no such showing.
Jennings v. Lamb appears inconsistent with prior Tennessee decisions, in so far as it permits the buyer to recover lost profits without
requiring a showing that the seller could have foreseen, at the time of
contracting, that there might not be an available market in which the
buyer could get like lumber if seller defaulted.3
CONDrONS
Meaning and Legal Effect of Condition in a Promise to Buy LandNecessity of Considerationin Settlement of a Liquidated Claim:During
the period covered by this survey article the Tennessee courts have
on two occasions found it necessary to deal with the meaning and
legal effect of conditions in a contract.
A condition, as the Restatement of Contracts3 points out, is either
(1) "any operative fact that will create some new legal relation, or
extinguish an existing relation," or (2) "words or other manifestations
that indicate that a fact shall have such operation." The legal effect
of a condition in a promise, then, is basically simple; no action can
be maintained for breach of promise unless the condition has occurred
or has been waived or excused.
In the two cases during the period covered by this survey, the defendants took the position that the nonoccurrence of a condition prevented the plaintiff-promisee from acquiring a right against the
defendant. In both cases the court had to deal at length with the
disputed point of exactly what was the meaning of the condition.
In Springfield Tobacco Redryers Corp. v. City of Springfield34 the
plaintiff, who owned real estate, brought suit against the defendant
city to recover damages for an alleged breach of a contract in which
the defendant promised to purchase realty from plaintiff. One of the
defenses was that a certain condition in defendant's promise to buy
had not occurred, and therefore plaintiff could not maintain its action
32. This inconsistency is revealed by a quotation from the court's opinion in
Black v. Love & Amos Coal Co., 30 Tenn. App. 377, 386, 206 S.W.2d 432, 435
(M.S. 1947) where the court said:
"In view of these circumstances, we think the parties must be held to
have contemplated, at the time of the making of the contracts, that there
might not be an available market and the defendant's non-delivery of
the coal, or any part thereof, might cause complainant to lose such profits
as she might make by selling the coal in the ordinary course of her
business."
33. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 250, comment a (1932).
34. 293 S.W.2d 189 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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for a breach of defendant's promise. Defendant-city had contracted
with plaintiff to buy certain real estate for $175,000 under the Industrial
Building Revenue Bond Act of 1951. Defendant would then lease this
land to a third party, the Wilson Athletic Goods Manufacturing Company. Defendant's promise to buy the real estate from plaintiff was
dependent upon two conditions: (1) that the issuance of bonds by
defendant with which to buy plaintiff's property be approved by the
voters of defendant-city; and (2) that the defendant lease the property
to the Wilson Company. The first condition was admittedly satisfied;
the voters approved the bonds. However, defendant refused to take
-plaintiff's property, contending that the second condition had not been
satisfied, in that a formal lease had not been executed by defendant
and the Wilson Company.
Defendant had executed a contract with Wilson in which Wilson
agreed to lease the property; they agreed on the terms of the lease
itself; and a copy of the unexecuted formal lease was attached to the
contract between Wilson and Defendant. Moreover, Wilson initialed
the formal lease, made slight modifications in it and mailed it back to
defendant with a letter stating that the "executed" lease was enclosed
in the letter. The letter from Wilson to defendant also stated that an
"extra executed copy" of the lease was enclosed for defendant to initial. Wilson later refused to take the property from defendant under
the lease and refused to do anything further about executing a lease.
Defendant then refused to take the property from plaintiff, claiming
that the condition of the Wilson lease had not been met. Plaintiff
sued defendant for damages for breach of contract. The lower court
held for defendant and plaintiff appealed.
The court of appeals reversed the lower court, holding that the condition of the Wilson lease had been satisfied. The court based its decision on this point on two alternative grounds. First, it said that the
condition as to the leasing of the property to Wilson was satisfied
when defendant and Wilson entered into a contract to make a lease.
Second, the condition was satisfied in that, in legal effect, Wilson and
defendant did execute a formal lease.
Some question might be raised as to whether the condition should
be construed to mean that all that plaintiff and defendant contemplated
was that the condition would be satisfied merely by a contract between
defendant and Wilson to make a lease. If the parties contemplated A
formal lease, then there is some difficulty in understanding how a
35
contract to make a lease would satisfy that condition.
35. Cf. Massee v. Gibbs, 169 Minn. 100, 210 N.W. 872 (1926) where the court
refused to find a binding contract, although the parties seemingly had agreed
on all the terms. Nevertheless, the court felt that the parties contemplated a
written draft as the consummation of their negotiations.
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However, the court seems to be on much firmer ground in holding
that Wilson and defendant did, in fact, execute a formal lease. They
agreed on the terms of a lease; Wilson initialed the formal document,
returned it to defendant in a letter describing it as an executed lease
and included a copy for defendant, describing it as an executed lease.
For all practical purposes that would seem to be sufficient to constitute
36
the execution of the formal lease.
As the court points out, it is no answer for the defendant to say that
Wilson had refused to live up to its agreement with defendant. That
was not the agreed condition. Defendant agreed to buy plaintiff's
land on the condition that the Wilson Company enter into a lease with
defendant. When the lease was made, the condition was fully satisfied
37
and defendant became bound to buy plaintiff's land.
Defendant also contended that it and plaintiff had a subsequent
transaction which constituted a settlement of any claim plaintiff might
have arising out of defendant's alleged breach of contract. After the
Wilson deal fell through and defendant refused to take plaintiff's
land, plaintiff did later sell the same land to defendant for $110,000,
or $65,000 less than defendant had contracted to pay for it. Plaintiff
claimed that the sale was made to minimize damages, but defendant
took the position that this sale constituted a settlement of plaintiff's
claim for breach of contract and a waiver of plaintiff's rights growing
out of the defendant's alleged breach of contract.
The court held that this sale to defendant did not constitute a waiver
nor a compromise settlement or an accord and satisfaction under the
earlier contract. Neither the subsequent contract nor deed made pursuant to it made any reference to the first contract.
The court held that the subsequent contract and deed could not be
a binding settlement of plaintiff's cause of action for the additional
reason that there was no consideration to support the later contract.
36. Geary v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 366 Ill. 625, 10 N.E.2d 350

(1937) has considerable bearing here. There a lessee in possession of premises,
mailed to the lessor original and duplicate copies of a renewal lease, to be
signed by the lessor and then returned to lessee. The lessor signed both copies
of the lease and mailed them to the lessee at 10:30 A.M. However, at 1:30 P.M.
on the same day the lessee mailed a letter stating that the lessee did not want
to renew the lease. In an action by the lessor against the lessee, the court held
there was a valid lease. The lessee sufficiently manifested its assent to all
the terms by mailing the copies of the lease and the lessor by signing them.
Signing of the formal document by the lessee was not necessary. To the
authority cited by the court on the sufficiency of initials as constituting a
signature in the execution of the lease, there can be added International

Filter Co. v. Conroe Gin, Ice & Light Co., 277 S.W. 631 (Tex. Comm. App.
1925). There the indorsement of "O.K." on an alleged contract amounted
to an approval by an executive officer of the Filter Company.
37. Even where a broker's commission is conditioned upon the consummation of a sale of land, the owner is not called upon to sue the vendee and
force title upon him in order to bring about the condition. Amies v. Wesnofske,
255 N.Y. 156, 174 N.E. 436 (1931).
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There may have been no consideration sufficient to make the second
agreement a binding obligation so as to constitute a binding compromise or settlement of plaintiff's claim growing out of the earlier contract, even if intended as a settlement. It is well ingrained doctrine
that neither a promise to perform, nor the performance, of what one
is legally bound to do is sufficient consideration. Nevertheless, we
must not lose sight of the fact that a good many states, including Tennessee, have abrogated this doctrine by statute. If, in fact, it had been
shown that the parties intended this subsequent sale to be a settlement
of the prior claim, then it likely would not fail for want of consideration. Tennessee has a statute eliminating the requirement of consideration where such settlements are in writing.38 Thus, a settlement in
writing, although lacking consideration, would appear to be binding.
Offer to buy Land-Meaning of Condition, "Upon Buyer's Being
Able to Purchase" Other Named Land: The Tennessee Court of Appeals was also called upon to construe and interpret a condition in an
offer to buy land in Real Estate Management, Inc. v. Giles.39 The
question was raised by an interpleader action to determine which of
two defendants (a prospective purchaser and a prospective vendor of
realty) was entitled to certain earnest money held by the complainant,
Real Estate Management, Inc., in connection with an offer to buy real
estate.
The controversy between the two defendants arose out of three
offers made by the prospective purchaser (defendant-Freeman) to
purchase three contiguous tracts of land from three separate owners.
The offers were made through complainant. Each offer to purchase
was expressly contingent "upon the buyer's being able to purchase"
two other named properties at stipulated prices. Earnest money was
deposited with each offer and the agreement stipulated that the
owner (prospective vendor) and complainant would divide the earnest money in the event the purchaser failed to complete the transaction.
One prospective vendor (Miss Giles) accepted Freeman's offer to
buy but the offers for the other two tracts did not ripen into agreements
to sell. One offer was rejected and the other one was never submitted
to the owner. Thereupon, one defendant (Miss Giles) and the other
defendant (Freeman) both demanded the earnest money deposited
with complainant, Real Estate Management, which brought the interpleader suit to determine who was entitled to the fund. Complainant
waived all claims to the money.
Defendant-Giles based her claim to the fund on the forfeiture provision of the offer, claiming that the condition for forfeiting the money
TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 24-706 to -707 (1956).
39. 293 S.W.2d 596 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).

38.
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had occurred, in that defendant-Freeman was financially able to purchase all three properties. Defendant-Freeman claimed the fund, alleging that the condition had not occurred, in that he was not able to
acquire the other two tracts of land. So the issue of the case was the
meaning of the condition in the offer. The question was simply this:
Did the condition "upon the buyer's being able to purchase" refer
to his financial ability to purchase, or did it refer to the purchaser's
being able to acquire the other tracts of land at prices designated in
his offer.
The chancellor awarded the deposit to Miss Giles, the prospective
vendor, holding that the condition referred to the prospective purchaser's financial ability to purchase.
In reversing the chancellor, the court of appeals held that the con-.
dition had reference to the prospective purchaser's ability to acquire
the other two tracts of land at his price, and not to the purchaser's
financial ability to purchase. The court thought that the chancellor's
interpretation of the condition placed a strained construction upon
the words of the condition. Moreover, the chancellor apparently disregarded the undisputed proof of the circumstances showing the purpose of the offer, which was that the prospective purchaser was trying
to buy all three tracts for business purposes.
Since the condition did not occur (Freeman could not get the other
two properties), an enforceable contract between Freeman and Miss
Giles did not come into existence. Therefore, the prospective purchaser
was entitled to a return of his deposit of $1,000 made with complainant.
In determining the meaning of the condition it was proper to look
to all the surrounding circumstances, including the reading together of
the three written offers containing the condition, since they were all
part of the same transaction and referred to each other.40 The court of
appeals appears to have adopted the more logical and reasonable construction of the condition in holding that the entire transaction showed
that the whole purpose of the prospective purchaser was to obtain the
three contiguous properties for a business purpose. Hence, the condition referred to his ability to acquire the other two tracts at his designated price, rather than to his financial ability to purchase the tracts.
Of course, the legal effect of a condition in a promise is that the
promisee gets no rights under the promise unless the condition occurs. 41
It did not occur. Therefore the prospective vendor got no rights under
the promise of the prospective purchaser.
40. Great American Indemnity Co. v. Utility Contractors, Inc., 21 Tenn.
App. 463, 111 S.W.2d 901 (M.S. 1937); 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 628 (rev. ed.
1936); 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 298 (1939).

41. 3 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 665 (rev. ed. 1936).
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GIFTS OF BANK DEPOSITS

Assignment of Bank Account-Delivery of Certificate of Deposit to
Donee: The Tennessee Court of Appeals was faced with the problem
of the revocability of a gratuitous assignment in Ray v. Leader Federal
Sav. & Loan Ass'n.4 T. J. Mathis, just a few hours prior to his suicide,
purported to assign a savings account in a savings and loan association
to Lavera McCoy Smith. This assignment was attempted by means
of a letter, accompanied by the pass book to the account, in which
book Mathis, the assignor, wrote, "This is to certify that I have made
the account over to Mrs. Lavera McCoy Smith." The accompanying
letter also recited substantially the same thing. The letter containing
the pass book and some cash was deposited in a rural mail box on a
mail route between 10:15 and 10:45 in the morning, and the rural mail
carrier picked up the letter and its contents. About one o'clock in the
afternoon the letter was deposited in a post office in Memphis, where
it was postmarked at 7:00 o'clock in the evening. The letter was
delivered to Mrs. Smith, the assignee, the next morning.
In the meantime, at about 11:30 o'clock on the same morning the
letter was mailed, Mathis, the assignor, committed suicide.
The account was claimed by Mrs. Smith, the assignee, and by
decedent's administratrix. The Association brought an interpleader
suit for determination of these adverse claims to the account.
In affirming the chancellor, the court of appeals awarded the savings
account to the assignee, Mrs. Smith. It held that the decedent had made
an assignment of the savings account and there was a sufficient delivery
of the account book to constitute a valid gift inter vivos.
There are at least two main problems involved in the decision in
this case. First, was this a revocable assignment, which would be
revoked by the assignor's death? The court did not spell out this
point very clearly. Second, if the attempted assignment was of such
nature that it was not revocable, was there a delivery of the subject
matter of the assignment sufficient to complete a gift?
Subject to certain well recognized exceptions, the right acquired
by the assignee under a gratuitous assignment is terminated by the
assignor's death.43 There are certain instances, however, where the
assignor's death does not terminate the right of the gratuitous assignee,
for the reason that the assignment is irrevocable." One of these in42. 292 S.W.2d 458 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1953).

43. Biehl v. Biehl's Adm'x, 263 Ky. 710, 93 S.W.2d 836 (1936); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 158(1) (1932); 2 WLISTON, CONTRACTS § 438A (rev. ed. 1936).
44. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 158 (1932), sets forth the general rule as to
the revocability and the exceptions:
"(1) The right acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous assignment is
terminated by the assignor's death, by a subsequent assignment by the
assignor, or by notification from the assignor received by the assignee
or by the obligor, unless,
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stances where the gratuitous assignment is irrevocable is the situation
where the assignment is accompanied by what is popularly referred
to as "indispensible documents." There are certain contractual rights
embodied in such instruments that are more than mere evidence of
a claim. Such documents are popularly looked upon as "property"
and not merely as the evidence of property.45 The law has given its
approval to this popular view where, by contract or custom, enforcement of the right is conditioned on the surrender of the document evidencing the right.46 The delivery of such document with donative
intent transfers a right, irrevocable if made inter vivos and revocable
if made causa mortis only on the condition to which all gifts causa
47
mortis are subject.
Completed gratuitous assignments involving such documents as
life insurance policies, non-negotiable stocks and bonds and savings
bank books fall into that category of irrevocable assignments. 48 Such
documents usually must be surrendered upon payment, and possession
is usually regarded as the concommitant of ownership. 49 Such choses
in action can therefore be assimilated to chattels, and like chattels a
gift can be made of them by delivery; that is to say, a gift can be

50
made by manually handing the document to the donee.

(a) the assignment is in a writing either under seal or of such nature as
to be capable of transferring title to a chattel without delivery thereof
and without consideration; or
(b) the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible token or writing, the
surrender of which is required by the obligor's contract for its enforcement, and this token or writing is delivered to the assignee; or
(c) the assignor should reasonably expect the assignment to induce
action or forbearance of a definite and substantial character by the
assignee or a sub-assignee, and before termination of the assignee's right
such action or forbearance is induced.
(2) If an assignee under an assignment revocable because gratuitous
obtains before revocation,
(a) payment or satisfaction of the obligation, or
(b) judgment against the obligor, or
(c) a new contract of the obligor by novation, he can hold what he has
thus acquired.
Whatever he obtains after revocation can be recovered from him by the
assignor."
See also 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 438A-40A (rev. ed. 1936). Where the
seal has efficacy, a gratuitous asignnent under seal is a convenient way of
making an assignment irrevocable. Chase Nat'l Bank v. Sayles, 11 F.2d 948
(1st Cir. 1926). But the efficacy of the seal has been abolished in Tennessee.
TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-1701 (1956).

45. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 439 (rev. ed. 1936).
46. Ibid.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid.; BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 60

(2d ed. 1955); 4 CORBIN, CON-

TRACTS §§ 915, 916 (1951).
49. Pierce v. Boston Five Cents Say. Bank, 129 Mass. 425, 37 Am. Rep. 71
(1880) (savings account book); BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 60 (2d ed.
1955); PATTERSON AND GOBLE, CONTRACTS 597, n.2 (3d ed. 1949).

50. BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY §§ 59-60 (2d ed. 1955). For a collection of
cases dealing with the execution of a gift by the delivery of a deposit certificate see Annot., 40 A.L.R. 508, 509 (1926).
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As a result of the development of this doctrine with respect to these
documents, there has evolved a well established exception to the general rule that the death of the assignor can revoke a gratuitous assignment. In essence, this exception says that rights acquired by the assignee under a gratuitous assignment are not terminated by the death
of the assignor where the assigned right is evidenced by a tangible
token or writing, the surrender of which is required by the obligor's
contract for its enforcement, and this token or writing is delivered
to the assignee.51 A checking account deposit book is not such a document. Consequently, the delivery of an ordinary deposit book for a
checking account is not effective as an irrevocable gift of a checking
account.5 2 Though such act is evidence of an intention to give, it does
not transfer dominion and control over the fund in the bank. Unlike
the savings account passbook, the ordinary passbook is neither a
statement of the account between the parties nor a necessary instrument for the withdrawal of the account.
In the case at hand such an "indispensable document" was involved.
The assignor's contract with the Association, as evidenced by his account book, provided that in order to make withdrawals the account
book must be presented. This account book the assignor (Mathis)
assigned and purported to deliver to the assignee (Mrs. Smith).
Hence it seems clear that the decedent did undertake to make a
gratuitous assignment that would not be revoked by his death, if there
was sufficient delivery of the savings account book to the assignee to
consummate an assignment before the assignor's death.
In the Ray case the court spent most of its time deciding whether
there had been a sufficient delivery and did not very satisfactorily deal
with the very basic question of whether the assignment was such that
death of the assignor would revoke it. Had not the assignment been
accompanied by the indispensible document of the savings account
book, death likely would have revoked the assignment; and thus the
assignee's rights would have been terminated, irrespective of how
3
complete the delivery of the document of assignment may have been.
The second problem in the Ray case is whether there was a valid
delivery of the indispensible document of the savings account passbook
51. RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §

158(1) (b) (1932); 2

WILUSTON, CONTRACTS

§ 439 (rev. ed. 1936); BRoWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 60 (2d ed. 1955).

52. Jones v. Weakley, 99 Ala. 441, 12 So. 420 (1893); Szabo v. Speckman,

73 Fla. 374, 74 So. 411 (1917); Simpkins v. Old Colony Trust Co., 254 Mass. 576,
151 N.E. 87 (1926); Pace v. Pace, 107 Miss. 292, 65 So. 273 (1914); Wilson v.
Featherston, 122 N.C. 747, 30 S.E. 325 (1898). Contra, McCoy's Adm'r v. McCoy,
126 Ky. 783, 104 S.W. 1031 (1907). In general, see Havinghurst, Gifts of Bank
Deposits, 14 N.C. L. REv. 129 (1936).
53. Cook v. Lur, 55 N.J.L. 373, 26 Ati. 803 (Sup. Ct. 1893) (leading case);
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 158(1) (1932); 4 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 912 (1951); 2
WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 440, 440A (rev. ed. 1936). See also note 52 supra.
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to the assignee before the assignor's death. If there was no such delivery before his death then this gratuitous assignment was revoked.5 4
The court found in the Ray case that there had been a sufficient
delivery of the assigned passbook when the assignor-decedent placed
it in the mail box from which it was picked up by the mail carrier,
processed thru the post office and delivered to the assignee, although
the assignor had committed suicide while the documents were in the
possession of the mail carrier.55
Mail, of course, can be withdrawn from the post office by the sender
by making an application for withdrawal, as prescribed by postal
56
regulations. The court recognized this.
The surrender of power and dominion of the subject matter is
generally regarded as the heart of the concept of "delivery." 57 A delivery to a third person (not the agent of the donor) on behalf of the
donee is effective, though unknown to the donee, if the transaction is
beneficial to the donee.58 Delivery to a third person who is the agent,
trustee or bailee of the donor will not constitute a "delivery" in the
eyes of the law, and the gift will fail for lack of a complete "delivery,"
for in such cases the donor retains by means of control over the agent,
dominion and control of the subject matter of the gift.59
Testing the Ray case by these propositions, the delivery of the letter
and pass book to the postal system, which the court thought was not
the assignee's agent, should be a sufficient delivery, even though the
assignor did have the power to withdraw the document from the mail.
There is, however, one Tennessee case that poses some difficulty.
In Traders' Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'i Bank,60 the court held that since

a letter could be withdrawn, and was withdrawn, from the mails, then
the deposit of the letter in the mails by the bank was not a binding

acceptance of a check by the bank when the check was deposited in
the mails. In Traders' Bank the court also treated the mails as the
agent of the sender. Hence a letter in the mails is in the possession of
54. Biehl v. Biehl's Adm'x, 263 Ky. 710, 93 S.W.2d 836 (1936); 2 WILLISTON,
CONTRACTS § 438A (rev. ed. 1936).
55. Ray v. Trader Say. & Loan Ass'n, 292 S.W.2d 458, 466 (Tenn. App.

W.S. 1956). When a note representing a loan is deposited in the mails by the
maker, there is a sufficient delivery although the maker died while the note
was in the mails. Trego v. Cunningham's Estate, 267 Ill. 367, 108 N.E. 350
(1915).
56. A postal regulation permitting the withdrawal of a letter has been in
effect since 1913. See Dick v. United States, 130 Ct. Cl. 703, 82 F. Supp. 326,

329 (1949); Traders' Nat'l Bank v. First Nat'l Bank, 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977
(1920).
57. BROWN, PERSONAL

PROPERTY § 41 (2d ed. 1955).
58. BRowN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 40 (2d ed. 1955); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
§ 439 (rev. ed. 1936). See also Scott v. Union & Planters' Bank, 123 Tenn. 258,

272-73, 130 S.W. 757, 761-62 (1910).
59. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY 94-100 (2d ed. 1955). See also Scott v.
Union & Planters' Bank, 123 Tenn. 258, 272-74, 130 S.W. 757, 760-62 (1910).

60. 142 Tenn. 229, 217 S.W. 977 (1920).
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an agent of the sender. If the questionable rationale of the Traders'
Bank case were followed, there would seem to be no delivery sufficient
to complete the gift in the case at hand, since the passbook was in the
possession of the assignor's agent (the mails) when the assignor committed suicide.
Deposits in Name of Depositorand Donee Claimant-Doneeas Third
Party Beneficiary: In Peoples Bank v. Baxter,61 the Tennessee Court
of Appeals was confronted with the validity of an attempt by a donordepositor to make a gift of a bank deposit by making the deposit payable to depositor, or on her death payable to the alleged donee, in an
action to determine the rightful ownership of the deposit, as between
the rival claimants to the deposit, consisting of the alleged donee and
the remaining next of kin of the depositor.
On May 21, 1951 the depositor made a deposit for one year with
Peoples Bank and received a certificate of deposit payable to the order
of herself, "or payable on her death to Mrs. W. A. Nippers" (her daughter) on the return of the certificate. This deposit was renewed some
four times, with some increases being made in the amount, but the
form of the certificate remained the same. On May 6, 1955, the depositor died intestate before the maturity date of the last certificate of
deposit in the amount of $2,040. At least this last deposit certificate
was delivered by her to Mrs. Nippers some time before the depositor's
death. Mrs. Nippers claimed the deposit, and so did the depositor's
other next of kin. To settle the matter, the depository bank filed a
bill of interpleader, naming the rival claimants as defendant.
In her answer to the bill of interpleader, Mrs. Nippers claimed the
fund on the ground that the depositor and the bank entered into a
valid contract by which the depository bank agreed to pay the money
to Mrs. Nippers. The opposing heirs of the depositor claimed the fund
was part of Mrs. Baxter's estate, on several grounds. They alleged
that the depositor was mentally incapable of entering into the contract
represented by the certificate of deposit; and that Mrs. Nippers used
fraud and undue influence on Mrs. Baxter.
The chancellor found in favor of Mrs. Nippers (the donee) and the
other heirs appealed. The Tennessee Court of Appeals affirmed the
chancellor by a two to one vote. The majority held for Mrs. Nippers
on the ground that she was a third party donee beneficiary of the contract between the depository bank and the depositor, as represented
by the certificate of deposit. Having concluded that Mrs. Nippers was
a third party beneficiary of the contract between the bank and depositor, the court held that under the law of Tennessee she could en61. 298 S.W.2d 732 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1956).
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force the contract, even though the suit is a bill of interpleader brought
by the depository bank.
Judge Carney delivered a rather lengthy dissenting opinion in which
he thought Mrs. Nippers should not receive these funds on "time deposit" as a gift. He thought the account should constitute a part of the
estate of Mrs. Baxter. He felt that the whole transaction was testamentary in nature and did not comply with the law of wills.
A large number of courts do hold that when a bank accepts a deposit
in the name of the depositor and another, it is regarded as undertaking
an obligation to the persons named. Consequently, a contract for the
benefit of a third person is etablished. The depositor is the promisee,
as well as one of the beneficiaries of the contract, while the donee (the
other person) is the third party donee beneficiary. The donee, as a
third party beneficiary, can enforce the contract which the bank had
with the depositor for the benefit of the donee beneficiary. 62 This is
the theory on which the court upheld the gift of this bank account to
Mrs. Nippers.
The majority of the court was convinced that there was neither a
gift inter vivos nor causa mortis in the Baxter case. True, it clearly is
not a gift causa mortis, because it was not made by depositor in contemplation of the imminent peril of death.63 Also, there may not have
been a gift of the deposit certificate itself at the time it was delivered
to Mrs. Nippers. But to say that it is not a gift inter vivos is not very
realistic, for in whatever light the matter is viewed there is a gratuitous transfer of funds of the donor to the donee, Mrs. Nippers. It would
be much more to the point to say that the rules governing gifts of
choses in possession do not control here, but that the gift is brought
about through the medium of a binding contract between the depositor
and the bank, whereby the bank agreed to pay the deposit to the donee,
Mrs. Nippers.64 Slice it any way you will, depositor made a gift to Mrs.
Nippers, and it must be a gift inter vivos, else it is a testamentary
disposition and it will fail.
What about the testamentary character of the transaction in question, since Judge Carney delivered a forceful dissent on the ground
that the gifts to Mrs. Nippers should fail on the ground that the trans62. First Nat'l Bank v. Mulich, 83 Colo. 518, 266 Pac. 1110 (1928); Illinois

Trust & Say. Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923); Perry v.
Leveroni, 252 Mass. 390, 147 N.E. 826 (1925); New Jersey Title Guaranty &
Trust Co. v. Archibald, 91 N.J. Eq. 82, 108 Atl. 434 (Ct. Err. & App. 3919);
Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio St. 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); Reap v.
Wyoming Valley Trust Co., 300 Pa. 156, 150 Atl. 465 (1930); Deal'- Adm'r. v.
Merchants' & Mechanics' Savings Bank, 120 Va. 297, 91 S.E. 135 (1917);
Wisner v. Wisner. 82 W. Va. 9, 95 S.E. 802 (1918); In re Staver's Estate, 218
Wis. 114, 260 N.W. 655 (1935). This theory has been expressly rejected elsewhere. Packard v. Foster, 95 N.H. 47, 56 A.2d 925 (1948).
63. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 54 (2d ed. 1955).
64. See BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 65 (2d ed. 1955).
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action did not satisfy the requirements of a testamentary disposition?
Actually it does not appear in the opinion that the heirs ever made
any claim, either in the trial court or in the court of appeals that the
transaction was testamentary. If the writer interprets the majority
correctly, they give what strikes the writer as a wholly novel (if not
weird) reason why they do not consider whether the transaction was
testamentary. The majority seems to say that Mrs. Nippers (the donee)
"concedes" that this was not a testamentary disposition and therefore
they are precluded from passing upon the question whether the disposition was testamentary. If that is the reason why the majority did
not consider the testamentary aspects, then we have a technique for
winning lawsuits that not only is novel but also is nothing short of
astounding. For we are thus introduced to the trial technique by which
one party can win a lawsuit by "conceding" that the other party is
in the wrong, for Mrs. Nippers would be the very party, and the only
party who must successfully contend that the transaction was not
testamentary, else she will lose the gift. Yet, the court has permitted
her to cross that stile by "conceding" that it is not testamentary.
Assuming that the testamentary character of the transaction was
properly before the court, what result should have been reached on
that facet of the case? Admittedly the requirements of a testamentary
disposition of property were not met.
If the evidence shows that the depositor intended that the putative
donee should take no present interest in the fund, but only to the payment remaining on the depositor's death, then the weight of authority
would strike down the attempted gift because of its testamentary
character. 65 It is possible to uphold such gifts of bank accounts, over
the objection that they are testamentary, on the theory that, although
the enjoyment of the donee (Mrs. Nippers) may be postponed, there
is nevertheless a present gift of a future right. 66 In the case at hand,
where the form of the deposit is payable to the depositor, or in case of
death to the claimant-donee, the transaction would seem to have all the
67
earmarks of a testamentary disposition, if we stop there.
Considering all the facts in the case at hand, however, was there a
present gift of the deposit with enjoyment postponed until depositor's
65. Cashman v. Mason. 166 F.2d 693 (8th Cir. 1948); Packard v. Foster, 95
N.H 47. 56 A.2d 925; Bulen v. Pendleton Banking Co.. 118 Ind. App. 217, 78
N.E.2d "449 (1948); Onofrey v. Wolliver, 351 Pa. 18, 40 A.2d 35, 155 A.L.R. 1074
(1944); Battles v. Mil]bury Savings Bank, 250 Mass. 180, 145 N.E. 55 (1924);
Sawyer v. Mabus, 107 S.C. 369, 92 S.E. 1029 (1917).
66. Innes v. Potter, 130 Minn. 320, 153 N.W. 604, 3 A.L.R. 896 (1915); Boyle

v. Dinsdale, 45 Utah 112, 143 Pac. 136 (1914); Union Trust & Savings Bank v.
Tyler, 161 Mich. 561, 126 N.W. 713 (1910); Candee v. Connecticut Savings
Bank, 81 Conn. 372, 71 Atl. 551 (1908); BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 65 (2d
ed. 1955).
67. See Vercher v. Roy, 171 La. 524, 131 So. 658 (1930).
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death; or on the other hand was there no intention that the claimant
(Mrs. Nippers) should have a present interest in the deposit? Judge
Carney marshals what he feels is sufficient evidence to warrant the
conclusion that there was no intention that Mrs. Nippers should have a
present interest. It strikes the writer, however, that it can be argued
with some force, at least, that even though it be conceded that there
was no intention that Mrs. Nippers should have a present interest at
the date of deposit, nevertheless when the depositor delivered the
certificate of deposit to Mrs. Nippers she did thereby show an intention
to give Mrs. Nippers a present interest at the time she delivered the
certificate. Whatever may have been depositor's previous intentions,
if she delivered the deposit certificate to Mrs. Nippers, with a present
donative intent, she divested herself of all control over the deposit and
gave the present sole ownership to the donee, Mrs. Nippers. 68 In
essence, it is arguable that she then made a gift to Mrs. Nippers by way
of a gratuitous assignment of her present interest in the account to Mrs.
Nippers and delivered to her the "indispensable document" (deposit
certificate), as evidence of her intent to create a present interest in
Mrs. Nippers. After she gave Mrs. Nippers the possession of the certificate of deposit, Mrs. Nippers alone could withdraw the funds, for as
we saw earlier the possession of a certificate of deposit ("time deposit")
is of such significance that it prevents the revocation of that assignment, although gratuitous, either by the assignor-donor's death or by
her positive attempts to revoke.69 The delivery of a certificate of
deposit is a device by which a valid present gift of a bank deposit can
be made, as we have seen already.7 0 One writer concludes, after a
searching examination of the cases dealing with gifts of bank accounts, that it "is practically impossible to show a testamentary intent
by evidence of oral declarations when there has been delivery of a
7
symbol." '
I suppose Judge Carney could properly say, however, that the evidence in the instant case shows that the deposit certificate was delivered to Mrs. Nippers only for the limited purpose of safekeeping and
not for the purpose of creating in Mrs. Nippers a present interest-all
of which may be entirely the correct analysis of the case.
ILLEGAL BARGAINS

Enforceability of Agreements not to Compete: In Herbert v. W. G.
Bush & Co.72 the Tennessee Court of Appeals was called upon to con68.
69.
70.
71.

Discussed at some length with Ray case, supra note 42.
See notes 44-47 supra and text supported thereby.
See notes 47-49 supra and text supported thereby.
Havinghurst, Gift of Bank Deposits, 14 N.C. L. REv. 129, 149 (1936).

72. 298 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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strue and apply the Tennessee statute73 which declares that contracts
and agreements which "lessen or which tend to lessen full and free
competition" in the manufacture and sale of articles are against public
policy, unlawful and void. This case arose in a somewhat unusual way.
Plaintiff, who owned shares in defendant corporation, sold his shares
of stock to said corporation and agreed not to compete in business
with it. Plaintiff later sued to have his agreement not to compete declared against public policy and thus void under the statute.
The plaintiff (Herbert) was at one time president of defendant,
W. G. Bush & Company, a corporation manufacturing and selling brick.
Plaintiff served in that capacity, until he was discharged in 1949.
Apparently plaintiff had been a potent force in helping to put Bush
in an excellent business condition. Plaintiff's family owned a large
part of the stock in the Bush Corporation. After protracted negotiations plaintiff sold his stock to Bush for cash and as a part of the sales
agreement plaintiff agreed not to compete with Bush in its brick business for 25 years in any area where the defendant or any of its named
affiliates were then operating. Some years later plaintiff decided to go
into the business of manufacturing brick in competition with Bush.
He then filed a suit in equity against the Bush Corporation, asking the
court to strike down his agreement not to compete on the ground
that it was in restraint of trade and void under the Tennessee statute.
The court of appeals affirmed the decree that plaintiff's agreement
not to compete was in restraint of trade and void as violating the public
policy declared by the Tennessee statute. The public interest in having
plaintiff's agreement declared void was thought by the court to be
superior to the interest of the defendant corporation in having the
agreement enforced. The court further held that plaintiff was not
estopped to retain the benefits of his contract of sale with Bush since
the agreement was against the public policy of the state. The court
also pointed out that this is not a suit to rescind the contract; hence
there was no reason for requiring plaintiff to restore the benefits.
Not all agreements in restraint of trade are treated as against public
policy and void under the Tennessee statute, but only those that constitute an "unreasonable" restraint. 74 In determining whether the particular restraint of trade comes within the statutory prohibition,
Tennessee has thus adopted the "rule of reason" which is the test
applied under the Sherman Anti-Trust Act.75 For practical purposes,
73. TENN. CODE ANN. § 69-101 (1956).
74. Baird v. Smith, 128 Tenn. 410, 161 S.W. 492 (1913).
75. United States v. United States Steel Corp., 251 U.S. 417 (1920); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911). This "rule of reason" was
expressly adopted and applied in State ex rel. Attorney-General v. Burley
Tobacco Growers' Ass'n, 2 Tenn. App. 674 (E.S. 1926) ; Dark Tobacco Growers'
Ass'n v. Dunn, 150 Tenn. 614, 266 S.W. 308 (1924); Baird v. Smith, 128 Tenn.
410, 161 S.W. 492 (1913).
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it appears that the agreements and combinations in restraint of trade
to which the Sherman Anti-Trust Act are applicable are the same as
those that are made unenforceable by the common law. That is to say,
the Sherman Act did not extend the field of unlawful agreements by
76
making unlawful some agreements that had theretofore been lawful
It merely took those agreements in restraint of trade that were already
unenforceable at common law because the restraint was unreasonable
and provided new penalties and enforcing sanctions.7 7 Thus, if an
agreement would be condemned as illegal under the Sherman Act, a
similar agreement likely would be held unenforceable at common
law.78
It should be rememberd that the interpretation and application of
the Sherman Act are variable with the time and place and climate of
opinion, in the same fashion as are the determination and application
of the rule of common law. Consequently, the criterion of "reasonableness" of the restraint, which is the test under both the Sherman
Act and at common law, is not crystallized but must be determined by
the courts, case by case.7 9
Since the Tennessee courts have construed the Tennessee statute
involved in the case at hand to condemn only restraints of trade that
are "unreasonable"-a term which is neither used nor defined in the
statute-this question arises: When is such a restraint "unreasonable"?
The purpose of any agreement restricting trade is almost always to
lessen competition, and this purpose has been regarded as so inimical
to the public interest that generally it is only in cases where the restrictive promise is "ancillary" to some other transaction that the
validity of the restraint will be upheld.80 Thus, if a dealer should pay
a competitor for his naked promise to stay out of a competing business,
the agreement would be an invalid restraint of trade stifling competition.81 Where, however, the same promise not to compete is a part of
76. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (1951).

77. See Appalachian Coals, Inc. v. United States, 288 U.S. 344 (1933); Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911); American Tobacco Co. v.
United States, 221 U.S. 106 (1911); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (1951).
78. 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (1951).
79. Ibid.

80. Cline v. Frink Dairy Co., 274 U.S. 445, 462 (1927); Pearson v. Duncan &
Sons, 198 Ala. 25, 73 So. 406 (1916); Domurat v. Mazzaccoli, 138 Conn. 327,
84 A.2d 271 (1951); Vanover v. Justice, 180 Ky. 632, 203 S.W. 321 (1918);

Bond Elec. Corp. v. Keller, 113 N.J. Eq. 195, 166 Atl. 341 (Ch. 1933); Burchell
v. Capitol City Dairy, Inc., 158 Va. 6, 163 S.E. 81 (1932); see Brecher v.
Brown, 235 Iowa 627, 17 N.W.2d 377, 378 (1945); 5 WLLISTON, CONTRACTS

§§ 1636, 1641 (rev. ed. 1937);

RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS

§ 515 (1932); 36 Am.

Jur., Monopolies § 54 (1941).
81. Non-ancillary agreements eliminating actual competition as well as
those eliminating potential competition have been invalidated. Actual competition: Oliver v. Gilmore, 52 Fed. 562 (C.C.D. Mass. 1892); Tuscaloosa Ice Afg.
Clemons v. Meadows, 123 Ky.
Co. v. Williams, 127 Ala. 110, 28 So. 669 (1900) ;"
178, 94 S.W. 13 (1906); Clark v. Needham, 125 Mich. 84, 83 N.W. 1027 (1900).
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a transaction by which the competitor's business was purchased, the
promise not to compete may be valid in the absence of a tendency of
82
dangerous monopoly.
Was plaintiff's promise not to compete in the Herbert case ancillary
to some other transaction? He did not sell a business to defendant,
but only his shares of stock in defendant. In so far as the requirement
of being "ancillary" is concerned, plaintiff's promise not to compete
should not be invalidated by the Tennessee statute, for it has been held
repeatedly that a shareholder in a corporation has an interest in the
good will as well as the tangible assets to such a degree as to justify
a promise by him, made to a purchaser of his shares, that he will not
thereafter compete with the corporation within a reasonable space and
time.83 This reasoning would seem to have force, however, only where
the selling shareholder has been actively engaged in the conduct of
the business with wide acquaintance with its customers, as in the case
at hand.84 For unless the corporation's good will would be materially
affected by the shareholder's entry into the competing business, it is
difficult to see how his promise differs in substance from a naked promise not to compete which is generally declared unenforceable.
If the promise of plaintiff not to compete in the brick business is to
be struck down as against the public policy of Tennessee, as expressed
in her statute, we must find from other aspects of the case that it was
an "unreasonable" restraint of trade since it satisfies the requirement
of being "ancillary" to some other transaction. We will next explore
other facets that may lead a court to conclude that a promise not to
compete is "unreasonable" and therefore unenforceable.
Earlier in the history of the law pertaining to restraints of trade,
the courts had to some extent developed rather definite, but artificial,
rules for determining whether a particular contract in restraint of
trade would be considered against public policy and unenforceable,
even though the restraint was ancillary to some other transaction.
Thus, an agreement in restraint of trade that was unlimited as to both
time and space would generally be treated as a general restraint and
Potential competition: Shapard v. Lesser, 127 Ark. 590, 193 S.W. 262 (1917);

Gross, Kelley & Co. v. Bibo, 19 N.M. 495, 145 Pac. 480 (1914); Smith v. Kou-

siakis, 172 S.W. 586 (Tex. Civ. App. 1915); Klaff v. Pratt, 117 Va. 739, 86 SE.
74 (1915).
82. Harris Calorific Co. v. Marra, 345 Pa. 464, 29 A.2d 64 (1942); see 5
WILmSTON, CONTRu
S §§ 1636, 1641 (rev. ed. 1937) and cases cited.
83. Ireland v. Craggs, 56 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1932); S. Jarvis Adams Co. v.

Knapp, 121 Fed. 34 (6th Cir. 1903); Martin v. Ratliff Furniture Co., 264 S.W.
2d 273 (Ky. 1954); Hopkins v. Krantz, 334 Mich. 300, 54 N.W.2d 671 (1952);
Hackenheimer v. Kurtzman, 235 N.Y. 57, 138 N.E. 735 (1923); see 6 CORBIN
CONTRACTS

§ 1388 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1641 (rev. ed. 1937).

84. See 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1388 (1951). An employee of a seller who
has no interest in the business and no good will could not validly bind himself
not to compete with the buyer. Domurat v. Mazzaccoli, 138 Conn. 327, 84 A.2d
271 (1951).
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void.85 Also, an agreement in restraint of trade limited as to time but
unlimited as to space often was considered void.86 On the other hand,
an agreement imposing a restraint reasonably limited in space would
not be treated as against public policy and void, although it was unlimited as to time.87 However, an agreement in which the restraint
was limited as to both time and space was much more likely to be
upheld and enforced. 88
These artificial rules which spoke only about whether the promise
in restraint of trade was unlimited as to time and/or space have virtually disappeared, and the ultimate test now employed by the judiciary
in determining the enforceability of a restraint is whether in light of
all the circumstances the restriction is "unreasonable." 89 In forming a
judgment on the question of "reasonableness" the court (not the jury)
will consider (a) whether the promise is wider than is necessary for
the protection of the promisee in some legitimate interest, (b) the
effect of the promise on the promisor and (c) the effect upon the public.90 The limitations of time and space, of course, may still be of
importance, even under this approach, in determining the reasonableness. 91 The American law is perhaps more concerned with the injury
to the public-not that arising indirectly from injury to the promisor,
but that arising from lack of competition with the consequent tendency
toward at least a partial monopoly, owing to the withdrawal of the
promisor from the field. 92 Thus, a contract in restraint of trade and
detrimental to the public interest may be declared violative of public
policy and void, although it is reasonable between the parties. 93 If, on
consideration of all the three facets of "reasonableness," the restriction
is such only as to afford fair protection to the interest of the promisee
85. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1639 (rev. ed. 1937); 17 C.J.S., Contracts
§242 (1939).
86. See 5 WILISTON, CONTRACTS § 1639 (rev. ed. 1937); 17 C.J.S., Contracts
§ 243 (1939).
87. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1638 (rev. ed. 1937); 17 C.J.S. Contracts
§ 244 (1939).
88. See 17 C.J.S. Contracts § 245 (1939).
89. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §

(rev. ed. 1937).

1386 (1951); 5 WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS §

1639

90. See 6 CoRBny, CONTRACTS § 1384 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636

(rev. ed. 1937). For an opinion that is unbelievably all-inclusive in its collection of authorities dealing, in part, with these three facets of "reasonableness,"
see Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685 (Ohio C.P.
1952).
91. See 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1638, 1639 (rev. ed. 1937).

92. Fairbanks Morse & Co. v. Texas Elec. Serv. Co., 63 F.2d 702 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 290 U.S. 655 (1933); see Arthur Murray Dance Studios, Inc. v.
Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 700 (Ohio C.P. 1952); 5 WILaSTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1635,
1640 (rev. ed. 1937) (promise implied on sale of good will); RESTATEmENT,
CONTRACTS § 518 (1932).

93. Farr v. Stearman, 264 Ill. 110, 105 N.E. 957 (1914); see Arthur Murray
Dance Studios, Inc. v. Witter, 105 N.E.2d 685, 700-01 (Ohio C.P. 1952); 5 WiLLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1636 (rev. ed. 1937); 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 249 (1939).
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and not so large as to interfere with the public interest or impose undue hardship on the party restricted, the agreement will be held reasonable and enforceable. 94 Each case in which the question of reasonableness of restraint arises must be determined according to its own
95
particular facts.
The limitations of space, while not ordinarily conclusive, may still
be of importance in determining the reasonableness not only from the
standpoint of the public interest but also as between the parties themselves. The purpose of enforcing a restraining promise that is ancillary
to a contract for the sale of a business with its good will is to make
good will a salable asset by protecting the purchaser in the enjoyment
of that which he has bought.9 6 It should follow that a promise by a
seller not to compete with the buyer is illegal and unenforceable
insofar as the promised restraint is in excess of the extent of the good
will purchased. That seems to be the law.97 A restraint is illegal and
unenforceable if it covers territory greater in extent than that in
which the seller has already developed business and good will, and
it is not made reasonable by the fact that the buyer was already doing
business in such larger territory. 98 In the instant case, plaintiff's agreement not to compete extended only to the areas in which defendant and
its named subsidiaries were operating at the time of the agreement.
Thus, from the standpoint of territorial limitations, plaintiff's agreement not to compete should be enforceable in so far as the parties to
the agreement are concerned.
The fact that a restrictive promise is unlimited as to time, or is for a
very long period of time, may militate against the reasonableness of
the restraint, but it is not conclusive of unreasonableness; if the promise is otherwise unobjectionable, it will be upheld. 99 Of course, it
should not be necessary or reasonable for the restraint to continue as
long as the business continues, but only as long as the personal business and customer relationships of the seller (plaintiff in the case at
94. E.g., Goldberg v. Tri-States Theatre Corp., 126 F.2d 26 (8th Cir. 1942);
Martin v. Ratliff Furniture Co., 264 S.W.2d 273 (Ky. 1954); see State ex. rel.
Attorney-General v. Burley Tobacco Growers' Ass'n, 2 Tenn. App. 674, 685
(E.S. 1926); 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 247 (1939).
95. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1397 (1951); 17 C.J.S., Contracts § 247 (1939).
96. Checket-Columbia Co. v. Lipman, 201 Md. 494, 94 A.2d 433 (1953);
Mattis v. Lally, 138 Conn. 51, 82 A.2d 155 (1951); see 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS §§
1385, 1387 (1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1641 (rev. ed. 1937).

97. Beit v. Beit, 135 Conn. 195, 63 A.2d 161 (1948); Checket-Columbia Co.

v. Lipman, 201 Md. 494, 94 A.2d 433 (1953); 6 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 1387
(1951); 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1635, 1641 (rev. ed. 1937).
98. See Schultz v. Johnson, 110 N.J. Eq. 566, 160 Atl. 379 (Ct. Err. & App.
1932); 6 CORBn,

CONTRACTS § 1387 (1951).

99. Wright v. Scotton, 13 Del. Ch. 402, 121 Atl. 69 (Sup. Ct. 1923); Storer v.
Brock, 351 II. 643, 184 N.E. 868 (1933); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106
N.Y. 473, 13 N.E. 419 (1887) (99 years); 6 CORBn , CONTRACTS § 1391 (1951);
5 WILIaSTON, CONTRACTS § 1638 (rev. ed. 1937).
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hand) remain such that his re-entry into the business would siphon
off business from the buyer (defendant in the case at hand). After
such danger has passed, the public interest in free competition should
govern; and the restraint should be struck down. 100 In essence, the
policy of allowing the owner of property to sell it on such terms as
to secure to the buyer the value of the property must be balanced
against the policy of resisting agreements that place restrictions on
competition.' 0 '
Plaintiff's promise not to compete, in the instant case, had a rather
long time limitation (25 years), and that may be longer than is reasonably necessary for the protection of the defendant. If that is true,
the court need not have invalidated the entire agreement because it
thought the time limit to be unreasonably long. The court may properly fix the limit of reasonableness and limit its enforcement accordingly.102
In the instant case, the court laid its heaviest emphasis on the notion
that plaintiff's agreement not to compete with defendant should be
declared unenforceable because of the public welfare, feeling, presumably that the agreement would lessen the full and free competition in the manufacture and sale of brick and would tend to control
the price of brick to the consumer. In support of its thesis that the
agreement should be nullified for the benefit of the public, the court
arrived at a conclusion which seems a little difficult to support. The

court said: 103
If the agreement not to compete is declared void, the public in the trade
area involved will benefit by being able to purchase brick at a reduction
of $5 to $8 a thousand, or at a savings of 20% to 25% of the present cost
price.
While there can be little doubt that such a bonanza to the purchasing
public would be most persuasive as. an argument for upsetting plaintiff's agreement not to compete, the writer is considerably at loss to
understand just how that conclusion could be established as a fact.
The opinion by the court does not shed any light on this questionable
and important point.
Moreover, the court gives very little attention to the question

100. 6 CORBIN,

CONTRACTS §

1391 (1951).

101. 5 WILaSTON, CONTRACTS

§

1636 (rev. ed. 1937).

102. In Oregon Steam Nay. Co. v. Winsor, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 64 (1873)',
a restraint for "a period of 10 years" was enforced for only seven. In Fullerton
Lumber Co. v. Torborg, 270 Wis. 133, 70 N.W.2d 585 (1955), an employee's
promise not to compete for ten years was held unreasonable, but the court did
enforce the agreement for the reasonable period of three years from the date
of the judgment. In Lewis v. Krueger, Hutchison & Overton Clinic, 153 Tex.
363, 269 S.W.2d 798 (1954), the restraint agreed to by a young physician had
no time limitation. The court enforced it for a reasonable period of three years.
103. 298 S.W. 2d at 752.
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whether the promisee (defendant corporation) needed the protection
from plaintiff's competition. It seems to dismiss this aspect of the
case with the observation that the good will of the defendant corporation could not be hurt much if plaintiff went into competition, in light
of the fact that defendant had fired plaintiff. There would seem to
be a non sequitur in that bit of judicial reasoning, however, as the reason for firing plaintiff may have no connection whatsoever with the
effect of plaintiff's competition upon defendant.
Balancing its conception of the detriment to the public interest
from the lack of plaintiff's competition in the brick business against
the protection defendant needed with respect to that competition, the
court concluded that the public interest tipped the scales against the
validity of plaintiff's agreement not to compete. The court felt that
the Tennessee statute was enacted principally to protect the public.
In conclusion, it may not be amiss to quote from the opinion of another court in a similar case, in which a shareholder had likewise sold
his stock to his corporation, agreed not to compete and later violated
his agreement by competing, claiming his agreement was void as
contrary to public policy. In Ireland v. Craggs10 4 the court enforced
the agreement not to compete, saying:1 05
It is the rule generally that, where one tardily ascertaining, after he has
had the fruits of a contract, that his agreement was illegal, invokes the
public interest "the interest of others than the parties" to enable him to
keep the fruits of his contract without standing to his bargain, courts are
slow to follow such interested leading. They will cautiously determine
for themselves whether there is a dominant public interest, an "interest of
others than the parties," involved in the enforcement of the contract
sufficient to overthrow the fundamental public policy that men full grown
and of sound mind may not, while holding to the benefits of a contract,
escape its burdens.

Validity of Agreement by Public Official to take less Compensation
than that Prescribedby Law: Can a public official or a candidate for
public office legally bind himself to take less compensation than that
prescribed by law? Such promises of frugality would, no doubt, be
most alluring campaign material to many voters. The Tennessee Supreme Court held in Lane v. Sumner County 0 6 that such an agreement
by a public official is against public policy and void. It followed, therefore, that the public official who had made such an agreement was
not legally bound by the agreement and was entitled to recover the
full amount of compensation prescribed by law. In that case the
court invalidated, as against public policy, an agreement by a circuit
104. 56 F.2d 785 (5th Cir. 1932).
105. Id at 787.
106. 298 S.W.2d 708 (Tenn. 1957).
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court clerk not to claim certain compensation to which he was entitled.
It seems that certain public officials, including clerks of circuit
courts, are entitled to apply particular fees collected during any term
of their office to salary deficiencies occurring in prior years. This
particular clerk had agreed with the county court not to make a claim
for these fees and the circuit court had entered a decree to that effect
based on the agreement. It is not clear from the opinion whether
the agreement was made before or after the clerk had acquired a right
to the fees. The clerk, as complainant, later petitioned to have that
part of the decree stricken on the ground that the agreement was void
as contrary to public policy. The Supreme Court affirmed the chancellor who had decreed that the agreement in which it was attempted to
reduce the clerk's compensation from that provided by statute is
against public policy and void.
A bargain by a public official or of one who is a candidate for a
public office for the payment of salary or fees smaller than those prescribed by law has many times been held invalid as violative of public
policy.107 Ordinarily, such agreements would seem to encourage "trafficking in public office." That is to say, such agreements would encourage the granting of public office to the lowest bidder, irrespective of his
qualifications for the office.' 0 8 Where the agreement is executed by the
actual payment and acceptance of the agreed cut-rate salary in full
satisfaction, there is a split of authority as to whether the official can
recover the rest of the salary provided by law. There are a good many
decisions holding that no further claim can be made, the courts often
saying that the public official is estopped to claim the residue of his
salary.10 9 But the actual payment of the lesser agreed amount should
not render the agreement any the less against public policy, for the
unwholesomeness of "trafficking in public office" has not been cured
107. United States v. Andrews, 240 U.S. 90 (1916) (army officer); Glavey v.
United States, 182 U.S. 595 (1901); Miller v. United States, 103 Fed. 413
(C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900); Hamilton v. Edmundson, 235 Ala. 97, 177 So. 743 (1937);
Nortonville v. Woodward, 191 Ky. 730, 231 S.W. 224 (1921); Allen v. City of
Lawrence, 318 Mass. 210, 61 N.E.2d 133 (1945); Saylor v. Trotter, 148 Tenn.
359, 255 S.W. 590 (1923); State ex rel. Kercheval v. Mayor and City
Council of Nashville, 83 Tenn. 697 (1885); 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1453 (1951);
6 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1730 (rev. ed. 1938); Anot., 70 A.L.R. 972 (1931).
108. Southern Bell Tel. and Tel. Co. v. Mitchell, 145 Ga. 539, 89 S.E. 514
(1916); Allen v. City of Lawrence, 318 Mass. 210, 61 N.E.2d 133 (1945); Pren-

tiss v. Dittmer, 93 Ohio St. 314, 112 N.E. 1021 (1916), State ex rel. Kercheval v. Mayor and City Council of Nashville, 83 Tenn. 697 (1885). A promise
to the voters by a candidate to serve for less than the salary prescribed by law,
not only has been declared illegal, but it also can vitiate the election. State
v. Collier, 72 Mo. 13 (1880); Moore v. White, 174 Tenn. 32, 122 S.W.2d 451
(1938). Such campaign promises by candidates were held illegal and not enforceable in Galpin v. Chicago, 269 Ill. 27, 109 N.E. 713 (1915) and State ex rel.
Kercheval v. Mayor and City Council of Nashville, 83 Tenn. 697 (1885).
109. O'Hara v. Town of Park River, 1 N.D. 279, 47 N.W. 380 (1890); State
ex rel. Hiss v. City of Akron, 56 Ohio App. 28, 10 N.E.2d 1 (1936); DeBoest v.
Gambell, 35 Ore. 368, 58 Pac. 72 (1899).
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by the performance of the illegal bargain. The contract is not purged
of the taint of illegality by reason of having been executed. Consequently, there is good authority which does permit a claim for the
remainder of the legally prescribed compensation although the agreement to take less has been executed.110 The courts of this persuasion
will not raise an estoppel or waiver of the right to compensation fixed
by statute. Tennessee goes along with those courts which hold that
such acceptance of the smaller agreed sum as full satisfaction will not
create an estoppel when the public official later tries to recover the
remainder of the compensation."' Also, Tennessee has permitted the
creditors of such public official to recover the remainder of the legally
prescribed compensation, although the official had accepted the lesser
agreed amount." 2 The acceptance of the lesser sum was said not to
estop either the office holder or his creditors from recovering the
difference between the amount paid and the amount prescribed by
law, since it is against public policy for a public official to agree to
remit part of his salary fixed by law. Tennessee has raised the bar of
estoppel where the agreement was entered into under apparent statu3
tory right, although the statute was later declared unconstitutional."
Likewise an official has been estopped to raise the constitutionality of
a statute reducing his compensation for a future term of office when
he campaigned on the promise that he would operate under the new
law and did take the oath of office under the new law, and operated
for some time under it. 114

Moreover, part payment of a liquidated debt generally is not regarded as a valid discharge, even if so accepted by the creditor, since
there is not a sufficient consideration for the promise to accept the
lesser amount. Thus, the public official's agreement to take less than
the compensation fixed by law, when made after the rendition of the
service, is unenforceable for lack of consideration. 115 If payment is
received and accepted under a bargain made before the services are
110. Glavey v. United States, 182 U.S. 595 (1901); Miller v. United States,
103 Fed. 413 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1900); Hamilton v. Edmundson, 235 Ala. 97, 177
So. 743 (1937); City School Corp. v. Hickman, 47 Ind. App. 500. 94 N.E. 828
(1911); Louisville v. Thomas, 257 Ky. 540, 78 S.W.2d 767 (1935); Allen v.
City of Lawrence, 318 Mass. 210, 61 N.E.2d 133 (1945); Pitt v. Board of Education of City of New York, 216 N.Y. 304, 110 N.E. 612 (1915); Rhodes v.
Tacoma, 97 Wash. 341, 166 Pac. 647 (1917); 6 WMISTON, CONTRACTS § 1730
(rev. ed. 1938).

111. Draper v. Putnam County, 25 Tenn. App. 269, 156 S.W.2d 348 (1941);
cf. Moore v. White, 174 Tenn. 32. 122 S.W.2d 451 (1938); State ex. rel.
Kercheval v. Mayor and City Council of Nashville, 83 Tenn. 697 (1885).

112. Moore v. White, 174 Tenn. 32, 122 S.W.2d 451 (1938), 15 TENN. L. REV.

720 (1939).

113. Collier v. Montgomery County, 103 Tenn. 705, 54 S.W. 989 (1900).
114. Saylor v. Trotter, 148 Tenn. 359, 255 S.W. 590 (1923).
115. Hamilton v. Edmundson, 235 Ala. 97, 177 So. 743 (1937); Rhodes v.
City of Tacoma, 97 Wash. 341, 166 Pac. 647 (1917); Ballangee v. Board of
County Comm'rs, 66 Wyo. 390, 212 P.2d 71 (1949).
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performed there would seem to be no lack of consideration for the
discharge of the remainder of the official's compensation claim; but
if that bargain is illegal, the consideration falls with it.116
If the official collects his statutory fee or salary and then pays an
agreed part of, it back into the public treasury, that has been held to
constitute a discharge of any claim by reason of an executed gift. He
is estopped to claim the amount."1 Also, the courts seem not to find
any violation of public policy where an official, pursuant to statutory
authorization, assents to a reduction in salary in times of depression
and shortage of public income, and a bargain for a reduction in salary
made by the official has been held valid." 8
DuEss
Making of Contract-Effect of Threat of Prosecution on Release
Obtained Thereby: In Exum v. Washington Fire & Marine Insurance
Co.," 9 the Tennessee Court of Appeals held that a release of a fire
insurance claim executed by the insured under an implied threat of
prosecution or public charge of arson of the burned insured property
was executed under duress and was void and of no effect. Plaintiff, the
insured under an automobile fire insurance policy, sued to recover on
his fire insurance policy covering an automobile which was destroyed
by fire. The insurance company, defendant, held a release of liability
executed by the insured by virtue of which release the insured was
paid $1.00, and $131.85 was paid to the bank holding insured's note for
the residue of the purchase price of the burned automobile. The face
amount of the policy was $350. In his bill of complaint in his suit on
the policy, plaintiff-insured, a thirty-seven-year-old negro man with an
eighth grade education, took the position that the release was not binding on him. He contended: (a) that he did not know what he was
signing when he executed the release; and (b) that the release was
void and of no effect because it was executed under a threat of prosecution for arson for burning the insured automobile, which constituted
duress.
Disagreeing with plaintiff's contention that the release was not binding on him, the trial court entered judgment for the defendant-insur116. See 6 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 1453 (1951).
117. Hobbs v. City of Yonkers, 102 N.Y. 13, 5 N.E. 778 (1886). But cf.; Galpin

v. Chicago, 269 III. 27, 109 N.E. 713 (1915).
118. In Vander Burgh v. Bergen County, 120 N.J.L. 444, 200 Ati. 561 (Ct.
Err. &App. 1938) the agreement of a judge to take less than salary prescribed
by law was upheld, where a statute authorized such agreement in times of
financial distress. The action by the judge was declared patriotic. An agreement to take less in an emergency, where agreement was authorized by
statute, was enforced in McCarthy v. McGoldrick, 266 N.Y. 199, 194 N.E. 406
(1935).

119. 297 S.W.2d 805 (Tenn. App. W.S. 1955).
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ance company. On appeal, the court of appeals reversed the trial court
and entered judgment for plaintiff-insured, for the difference between
the face amount of the policy and the amount paid the bank in connection with the release. The court of appeals did not hold that the
release was void because insured did not know he was signing a release, but did hold the release void and of no effect because it was
executed under threats of criminal prosecution for arson, which constituted duress.
The undisputed evidence showed that an agent of the defendantinsurance company investigated the fire loss and refused to pay the
loss, telling the plaintiff-insured that he did not believe insured's
story as to how the fire occurred and that the matter would be referred
to the State Fire Marshal for further investigation as to the possibilities
of arson. The agent did report the matter to the Fire Marshal's office
and further investigation was made. Plaintiff-insured was required by
the Fire iMarshal to go to the Fire Marshal's office, where he was interrogated by both the Marshal and the insurance agent. They told insured they believed he burned the automobile. Insured refused to
admit burning it. While in the Fire Marshal's office, insured agreed
that he would settle for the balance he owed the bank, rather than
have his reputation ruined. The release was then executed while
insured was in custody of the Fire Marshal.
The court of appeals felt that this undisputed evidence was clear,
cogent and convincing and led to the inescapable conclusion that the
release was executed under an implied threat of prosecution or public
charge of arson. The court then concluded that the release was
executed under such circumstances that insured's act was not done
as a free and voluntary act on his part, but as a result of duress, and
hence the release should be considered void and of no effect.
The modern tendency of the courts is to hold that any unlawful
threats which do in fact overcome the will of the person threatened,
thus actually inducing him to do an act which he would not otherwise
have done and which he was not bound to do, constitutes duress; and
this is a question that must be determined by considering the age, sex,
120
capacity, relation of the parties and all the attendant circumstances.
120. Ingalls v. Neidlinger, 70 Ariz. 40, 216 P.2d 387 (1950); Slade v. Slade.
310 11. App. 77, 33 N.E.2d 951 (1941); Morreil v. Amoskeag Say. Bank, 90 N.H.
358, 9 A.2d 519 (1939); Simpson v. Harper, 21 Tenn. App. 431, 111 S.W.2d 882
(M.S. 1937); see Darnell-Love Lumber Co. v. Wiggs, 144 Tenn. 113, 230 S.W.
391 (1921); 5 WILUSTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1604, 1605 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT,
CONTRACTS § 493 (1932): "Duress may be exercised by
(a) personal violence or a threat thereof, or
(b) imprisonment, or threat of imprisonment, except where the imprisonment brought about or threatened is for the enforcement of a civil
claim, and is made in good faith in accordance with law, or
(c)threats of physical injury, or of wrongful imprisonment or prosecution of a husband, wife, child, or other near relative, or
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There are a number of decisions holding that a threat of criminal

prosecution does not constitute such duress as to make voidable a
transaction induced thereby.' 21 The arguments advanced in support
of this view are two-fold: (1) that whether the person threatened is
guilty or not, a threat of prosecution is not necessarily a threat of
immediate arrest and imprisonment, and, is not, therefore, sufficient
means of terrorizing another; (2) that if the threatened person is
guilty, the threat is one which the person criminally injured has a right
to make. m2
However, the court of appeals is supported both by reason and by
good authority in taking the opposite position to the effect that threats
of criminal prosecution may constitute duress12S Mr. Williston, an
eminent authority in the field of contract law, is of the firm conviction
that the view which says that threats of criminal prosecution may not
be duress is unsound. He is of the opinion that everyone knows that
the threat of a well-founded prosecution, which is likely to end in imprisonment, is often quite sufficient to put even a brave man in fear.
He also thinks that the argument of this view goes too far, for if sound,
threats of prosecution without cause likewise could not be duress, and
most courts agree that threats of ill-founded criminal prosecution may
be duress.124 As to the argument that the threat of criminal prosecution
can not be duress because the injured party had a right to make the
threat, Mr. Williston and those of his persuasion are of the opinion
that this argument, too, is unsound. The authorities of this view
treating the threats as duress regard it as an improper effort of the
threatener to use for his private benefit processes provided for the protection of the public and the punishment of crime. One who has thus
overcome the mind and will of another for his own advantage, by
threatening criminal prosecution, is thought to be guilty of a perversion
(d)threats of wrongfully destroying, injuring, seizing or withholding
land or other things, or
(e) any other wrongful acts
that compel a person to manifest apparent assent to a transaction
without his volition or cause such fear as to preclude him from
exercising free will and judgment in entering the transaction."
121. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1612 (rev. ed. 1937); 17A Am. JuR., Duressand

Undue Influence § 13 (1957); Annot., 17 A.L.R. 325, 339 (1922).
122. See, e.g., Hilborn v. Bucknam, 78 Me. 482, 7 Atl. 272, 273 (1886); Ingebrigt v. Seattle Taxicab & Trf. Co., 78 Wash. 433, 139 Pac. 188, 189 (1914); 17A
Am. Jum., Duress and Undue Influence § 14 (1957).
123. Belote v. Henderson, 45 Tenn. 471 (1868); Simpson v. Harper, 21 Tenn.
App. 431, 111 S.W.2d 882 (M.S. 1937) (threat to prosecute husband of defendant-indorser constituted duress which gave indorser a defense). See Ingalls v.
Neiflinger, 70 Ariz. 40, 216 P.2d 387, 390-91 (1950); Coleman v. Crescent
Insulated Wire & Cable Co., 350 Mo. 781, 168 S.W.2d 1060, 1067 (1943); Morreill
v. Amoskeag Sav. Bank, 90 N.H. 358, 9 A.2d 519, 524 (1939); 5 WILsToN,
CONTRACTS §§ 1612, 1613, 1614 (rev. ed. 1937); RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS § 493

(1932); 17A AM. Jun., Duress and Undue Influence § 12 (1957).
124. Lighthall v. Moore, 2 Colo. App. 554, 31 Pac. 511, 512 (1892).
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and abuse of laws which were made for another purpose. 1 The thinking of Mr. Williston and those courts that agree with his view is that
where anything other than satisfaction of the precise civil obligation
for which a criminal is liable is obtained by coercion through threats
of prosecution by the creditor, the transaction should be voidable on
the grounds of duress126 The opportunities for abuse are too considerable to allow creditors to use such means to enforce settlements. Also,
where the threat of prosecution induces fear of disgrace, it may con27
stitute duress.Having decided that the implied threat of criminal prosecution for
arson constituted duress, in the case at hand, the court of appeals then
declared that such duress rendered the release executed by plaintiffinsured "void and of no effect." In declaring the release void and of
no effect, the court seems to have gotten itself on somewhat shaky
grounds; for duress, as an inducement, generally renders the transaction "voidable" only. 128 That distinction, while not material in the
case at hand, can become crucial. The right of the coerced party to
rescind a transaction induced by duress ordinarily is a defeasible one
which may be lost by his ratification, because it is voidable only and not
absolutely void. 2 9 Or, in situations simply induced by duress, equity
will not give relief if land, chattels or negotiable instruments acquired
by the duress have gotten into the hands of a bona fide purchaser for
value. Thus, where we have a "duress in the inducement," such as in
the case at hand, the intervening bona fide purchaser gets an indefeasible title.1 0 There may be certain kinds of duress which do make
a transaction actually void. Justice Holmes thought that the transaction would be void where one by force compels another to go through
certain indications of assent, as by taking his hand and forcibly guiding it. No contract would be made under such circumstances, for there
would be a mere automaton and no real expression of assent. 13 That
was not the situation in the case at hand, however. Likewise, where
125. See Morse v. Woodworth, 155 Mass. 233, 251, 29 N.E. 525 (1892).

126. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1616 (rev. ed. 1937).
127. Citizens' Nat'l Bank v. Polski, 122 Neb. 658, 241 N.W. 110 (1932);
Harper v. Murray, 184 Cal. 290, 193 Pac. 576 (1920).
128. 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS §§ 1616, 1624, 1626 (rev. ed. 1937).
129. 5 id. § 1626; 17A AM. Ji ., Duress and Undue Influence § 18 (1957).
130. Randolph v. Lewis, 196 N.C. 51, 144 S.E. 545 (1928); Deputy v. Stapleford, 19 Cal. 302 (1861). See Annot., 62 A.L.R. 1477 (1929), dealing with the
validity of contracts executed under duress exercised by third parties. See
also 5 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1627B (rev. ed. 1937).
131. See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153, 13 N.E. 596, 598 (1887); 5 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS § 1624 (rev. ed. 1937); 17A AM. JuR., Duress and Undue
Influence § 18 (1957). For a case where the Tennessee Supreme Court declared
a transaction "void" for duress and further declared that recovery could be
had against a third party, although the duress consisted of threats and would
seem to be duress only as to inducement, see Belote v. Henderson, 45 Tenn.
(5 Cold.) 471 (1868). The court thought that although actually void, the
transaction could be ratified.
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one is coerced into giving apparent assent to a transaction the nature
of which he does not know or have reason to know, it is said that the
transaction would be void.' 32 But in the ordinary case of duress, as in
fraud, there is an actual expression of assent to the very transaction in
question, though it is inequitable to enforce it because of the manner in
which assent is obtained. Hence, the transaction would be rendered
133
voidable only and not void.
AsSIGNMENTS

Delegation of Duties-Effect of Phrase "Or Order"in Written Negotiations for Lease as Authorizing Assignment or Substitution of Third
Party: in Berger v. Paalzow,;13 the Tennessee Court of Appeals was
called upon to construe an alleged assignment ot a contract to lease an
office building. The alleged lessors relused to execute a formal lease
when it was discovered that the parties who carried on the negotiations
(Berger Brothers) had substituted the name of a third party (Halina
Berger) as the lessee in the formal lease. In an unsuccessful suit
asking for specific performance of the execution of the formal lease or
damages, brought by the parties who negotiated the lease, for the
use of the substituted third party, against the defendants-alleged lessors, it was claimed that certain language in the written negotiations
authorized the substitution of this third party as lessee. The pertinent
part of that language appears in a lengthy letter to the defendants
written by the parties who negotiated for the lease. After detailing
many terms and conditions of a proposed lease, the letter to the defendants-owners concludes in this fashion: "It is understood that if this
proposition be accepted a lease embodying these and usual pr6visions
will be executed by the owners of the building and ourselves, or order,
as tenants." (Emphasis added). It is claimed by complainants that
the words "or order" authorized the ostensible lessees (Bergers) to
substitute the third party (niece of Bergers) as the lessee.
The defendants-owners purported to accept the proposition offered
in the foregoing letter, but added certain modifications. Berger Brothers then, in turn, purported to accept the owners' offer with its modifications. The key words "or order" do not appear again, either in
owners' modified acceptance (counter offer) or in the foregoing letter
by Berger Brothers to, owner purporting to accept his modified proposition.

When sued for their refusal to execute the formal lease to the third
party, the lessors took the position that the Berger brothers (who
negotiated the lease) represented themselves to be men of wealth
132. See 5

WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 1624 (rev.

ed. 1937).

133. See Fairbanks v. Snow, 145 Mass. 153. 13 N.E. 596, 598-99 (1887); 17A

AM. JuR., Duress and Undue Influence § 18 (1957).

134. 289 S.W.2d 861 (Tenn. App. E.S. 1956).
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and men experienced in the management of office buildings, and had
invited defendant-lessors to make a full investigation of these representations. Defendants did make the investigation and learned that
the Berger brothers were millionaires and enjoyed a splendid reputation with regard to management of properties of substantial value.
Based upon these facts, defendants refused to execute the formal lease,
claiming they agreed to deal with the Berger brothers personally and
not with a third party (the substituted lessee) about whom defendants
knew nothing.
In the correspondence between the parties, the Berger brothers
undertook to do a great many things relative to the lease they were
negotiating, in addition to the payment of an annual rental in excess
of $30,000 for more than thirty years. Among those additional duties
which the Berger brothers agreed to perform were paying taxes, carrying insurance and workmen's compensation, paying certain costs,
making alterations and improvements, air conditioning the building
and installing new boilers.
It would appear that these duties involve sufficient discretion and
judgment on the part of the Berger brothers, as lessees, so that these
duties could not be assigned or delegated to a third party in the absence
of consent by the owners. The performance required by these varying
duties appears to be a personal one which defendant-owners agreed
could be performed only by these millionaire Berger brothers, who
enjoyed a splendid reputation with regard to management of office
buildings of substantial value. Defendant-owners thus reposed special
trust and confidence in the Berger brothers. Hence, in the absence of
consent by the owners performance of these duties by a substituted
person could not be delegated or assigned. 135
So we come to the next question which is the pivotal point in the
case. Did the use of the words "or order" mean that the defendantowners had thus agreed to permit Berger Brothers to substitute a third
party in the lease to perform these duties?
Complainants contended that the words "or order" are words of
negotiability, and gave the Berger brothers the right to name a third
party (Halina Berger) as lessee in the formal lease. In the writer's
opinion the most that these words could mean is that they are equivalent to "or assigns." The phrase "or order" are words of art and appear
properly to be used only with negotiable paper.136 Owners' promise to
make a lease cannot be negotiable for in order to be negotiable a prom135. For an elaborate discussion of this facet of the case, see 4 CORBIN,

CONTRACTS § 865-66 (1952); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 411-IIA (rev. ed. 1936).
A dutv to construct a building was held nondelegable in Johnson v. Vickers,
139 Wis. 145, 120 N.W. 837 (1909). A contract to do electrical wiring was
held nondelegable in Swarts v. Narragansett Elec. Lighting. Co., 26 R.I. 388,
59 Atl. 77 (1904).
136. See BLACK, LAW DICTIONARY 1247 (4th ed. 1951).

CONTRACTS

1049

ise must be for the payment of money.13 7 Here owners' promise was to
deliver a building under a lease.
Even if we assume that the words "or order" are equivalent to the
words "or assigns," which may render assignable an otherwise nonassignable contract, 3 8 still it is believed that these words did not give
Berger Brothers the right to substitute a third party as lessee in the
formal lease.
It should be noticed that the Berger brothers did not purport to
assign a lease, which they had with owners, to the third party; nor did
they apparently purport to assign to the third party a contract in
which the owners agreed to make a lease to them. The Berger brothers
simply undertook to substitute a third party as the lessee in the formal
lease, thereby apparently letting the brothers completely off the hook
insofar as their liability was concerned. So even if it is assumed that
the words "or order" would authorize the Berger brothers to assign
an executed lease, or to assign a contract whereby the defendantowners agreed to make a lease, nevertheless that is considerably different from saying that those words of art authorized the brothers to
slide out of their obligations and permitted an unknown substituted
third party to hold defendant-owners to a lease.
Although a contract is, in fact, "assignable," either because of its
inherent nature, or because the other party has consented, the assignor
remains personally liable for the performance of his duties under the
assigned contract. 139 The assignor cannot escape liability for the performance of his duties by the simple expedient of "assigning" (really
delegating) his duties under the contract. 14°
Parties to a bilateral contract often do attempt to effect the substitution of the liability of a new party for that of one of the original parties,
and frequently call such an attempted transaction an assignment al141
If the so-called assignor intends by
though it is really a novation.
the transaction to be free from all further liability, then Mr. Williston
says:

Such an offer may always be refused, and if the so-called assignor [Berger
brothers] in effect has indicated that he will not thereafter be responsible
for the performance of his promise, and that the other party to the contract [defendant-owners] must look solely to the so-called assignee
[Halina Berger], there is a repudiation of contract by the assignor which
justifies the injured party [defendant-owners] in refusing to continue
42

performance.1

137. NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS LAW § 1: TENN. CODE ANN. . 47-101 (1956).
138. See 4 CoRIN, CONTRACTS § 871 (1952); 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 423

(rev. ed. 1936).

139. See 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 411 (rev. ed. 1936).

140. Ibid.
141. 2 id. § 420.

142. Ibid. To the same effect, see 4 CoRBin, CONTRACTS § 866 (1952).
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Does not the statement of this proposition by Mr. Williston pretty
well describe the transaction in the case at bar?
This leading authority on contract law, Mr. Williston, elsewhere
lends cogent support to the view that the words "or order" would
not authorize the Berger brothers to delegate or assign their duties
under the lease or under a contract to make a lease. Mr. Williston
discusses the effect of adding the word "assigns." He states that as a
general rule the insertion of the word "assigns" or its equivaZent does
indicate a willingness on the part of the obligor to render performance
to an assignee if so desired. Then he concludes with this proposition:
Notwithstanding the use of such words, ("assigns"), however, the intention of the parties must be gathered from a consideration of all the terms
and of the entire tenor of the contract, interpreted in light of surrounding
circumstances, and taking everything into consideration it may appear
that assignment was not permitted without the assent of the other contracting party.143
As the court points out, there are surrounding circumstances
strongly indicating that defendant-owners did not assent to having a
third party substituted as lessee. There is the trust reposed in the millionaire Berger brothers, who had splendid reputations for managing
office buildings, which information was obtained at the invitation of
the Berger brothers during their negotiations. On the other hand,
defendant-owners knew nothing about the substituted third party,
Halina Berger. Moreover, the brothers in their negotiations for a
lease specifically characterized the parties to the lease so as to leave
little doubt they personally intended to execute the lease. In these
negotiations they used the pronouns "we" twenty times, "our" four
times, "us" ten times, and "ourselves" twice. In defendant-owners'
correspondence to the Berger brothers, making his modified offer,
which the Bergers allegedly accepted, they use the language "your
offer," "your part," "in the event you exercise any or all of your options" and "you are to continue throughout the term of the lease."
Also, defendant-owners in their modified offer make it clear that the
Berger brothers must hold owners harmless against liens "made by
you or sub-tenants." Defendants and the Berger brothers had expressly agreed previously that a certain bank would be a sub-tenant
of the building in question and the Bergers had signed a lease with
the bank in the name of Berger brothers, not in the name of the party
they tried to substitute in the lease with defendant-owners.
IMPLIED & QUASI CONTRACTS

Action for Services for Managing Farm Where Agreement Indefinite
143. 2 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 423 (rev. ed. 1936).
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as to Terms: In Murray v. Grissim 44 the Tennessee Court of Appeals
had before it a question of whether the conduct of the parties was
such that a jury was warranted in finding either a claim based on
quasi contract or on an implied contract for services in managing a
farm, extending over a period of approximately eleven years.
Defendant Murray owned a 296 acre farm which was used for operating a dairy, growing hay and other crops, and raising livestock. Defendant received this farm under his father's will. It was to recover
for his services in managing this farm for defendant for the eleven
years after the father's death that plaintiff sued. There was no express
contract between plaintiff and defendant, but plaintiff contended that
he had a valid claim, based on either implied contract or quasi contract.
For several years prior to the time when defendant became owner
of the farm, plaintiff had managed it for defendant's father. Defendant's father and plaintiff were close friends, and the father had aided
plaintiff in the livestock business. Plaintiff managed the farm for
defendant's father without charge. Plaintiff had no dealings, however,
with defendant and scarcely knew him prior to the time when defendant received the farm under his father's will. There was evidence
from which the jury could have found that when defendant took
charge of the farm, he requested plaintiff to continue managing it.
Plaintiff testified to this request by defendant and there was no denial.
There was, however, no conversation or express agreement or understanding between plaintiff and defendant as to what was to be paid
plaintiff for managing the farm. Plaintiff managed the farm for
defendant from March, 1941, when defendant received the farm under
his father's will, until August, 1952, at which time defendant sold the
farm.
Plaintiff's suit was based on both quasi contract and implied contract. Defendant resisted plaintiff's claim on the ground that plaintiff's services were rendered gratuitously and that much of the claim
was barred by the six-year statute of limitations. Defendant's contention that plaintiff rendered the services gratuitously was in part based
on the fact that plaintiff had managed the farm for defendant's father
without pay. Also plaintiff and defendant had a partnership in the
race horse business, part of which business was done on plaintiff's
own farm and part on defendant's farm. When defendant sold his
farm, he sold his interest in the partnership horses to plaintiff for
$4,000. Plaintiff gave defendant a note for this partnership interest,
$2,500 of which was still owing when plaintiff brought the suit in the
case at hand. Plaintiff made payments on this partnership claim, and
144. 290 S.W.2d 888 (Tenn. App. M.S. 1956).
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got extensions of time on the payments of the note, Without ever mentioning his claim for managing the farm. All these factors, said defendant, showed that plaintiff managed the farm gratuitously.
The jury rendered a verdict in favor of plaintiff for $13,600, less a
credit of $2,500, which was the balance owing plaintiff on the partnership note. The trial court entered judgment for plaintiff for $11,100
and costs. On appeal by defendant to the court of appeals, the court
affirmed the judgment for plaintiff by a two to one vote. Judge
Shriver rendered a vigorous dissent on the ground that the court
should apply the statute of limitations to bar plaintiff's recovery for
services performed for more than six years before suit was filed. The
majority thought that no part of plaintiff's claim arose until defendant
sold the farm, and thus none of it was barred by the six-year statute,
since the suit was brought within six years after defendant sold the
farm.
Speaking for the majority, Judge Felts wrote an admirable opinion
in support of the court's conclusion that the jury was warranted in
finding that there was an implied contract. For his major premise,
Judge Felts took the position that from the mere rendering of the
services by one and their acceptance by another, there may arise
liability for the services either in quasi contract, or an implied promise
or contract to pay for the services. He then concluded that from the
evidence the jury could have found that the defendant requested
plaintiff's services not as a favor but under such circumstances that a
reasonable man would infer that defendant meant to pay for them;
that plaintiff did understand that the defendant would pay him the
reasonable value of such services when they were terminated or the
farm was sold; and that defendant became liable upon an implied
contract to make such payment.
While there are distinct differences between liability based on
"quasi contract" and "implied contract," the courts do not always
differentiate between these two different theories of liability. 45 Moreover, a case may be one of implied or quasi contract depending upon
a slight variation in facts.
The courts often use the term contract "implied in law" to refer
to quasi contract, which is a liability imposed by law, irrespective of
any manifestation of assent by the parties and sometimes against
even a clear expression of dissent, in order, generally, to prevent
unjust enrichment. 46 Whereas an "implied contract," often called a
145. See Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1946); 1 WI.LSToN,
CONTrACTS § 3 (rev. ed. 1936).
146. See Morse v. Kenney, 87 Vt. 445, 89 Atl. 865, 867 (1914); Miller v.
Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337, 338-39 (1916); See also Matarese v. MooreMcCormack Lines, Inc., 158 F.2d 631 (2d Cir. 1946); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 19
(1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS § 3 (rev. ed. 1936).
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contract "implied in fact," is a genuine contract (offer and acceptance)
which is spelled out of, or implied from, the conduct of the parties,
and differs from an express contract, essentially, only in the method
of proof.

147

If a party giving the performance (plaintiff) expects to be paid, and
the other party (defendant) either intended to pay or should have
known that plaintiff expected to be paid, then there arises a claim
based on implied contract. 14 8
If the party giving the performance (plaintiff) expected to be paid,
and if plaintiff conferred a benefit on defendant; and if plaintiff was
not officious, then plaintiff has a claim based on quasi contract. 149
It will thus be seen from an examination of the requirements of
both implied contract and quasi contract that plaintiff will be denied a
recovery if he performed his services gratuitously-without expectation of pay. 150 That was one of the grounds for resisting recovery in
the case at hand.
147. Miller v. Schloss, 218 N.Y. 400, 113 N.E. 337, 338-39 (1916). In speaking

of implied contracts, in Morse v. Kenny, 87 Vt. 445, 89 Atl. 865, 867 (1914),
the court said: "[S]uch a promise is implied from the understanding of the
parties, inferred as a question of fact from their conduct and the surrounding
circumstances; such acts and circumstances as show, according to the ordinary course of dealing and the common understanding of men, a mutual
intent to contract.
"... It is inferred from the conduct of the parties instead of from their

spoken words; or, in other words, the contract is evidenced by conduct instead

of by words." The court said in Peters v. Poro's Estate, 96 Vt. 95, 117 Atl. 244,
246-47 (1922): "The terms 'express contract' and 'contract implied in fact'
indicate a difference only in the mode of proof. A contract implied in fact
is implied only in that it is to be inferred from the circumstances, the conduct,
acts, or relation of the parties, rather than from their spoken words." See
also Martin v. Campanaro, 156 F.2d 127, 130 (2d Cir. 1946); 1 CoRBnv, CONTRACTS § 18 (1950); 1 WILLISTON, CONTRACTS
RESTATEMENT, CONTRACTS §§ 5, 72 (1932).

§§

3, 36,

36A (rev. ed. 1936);

148. In re Montgomery's Estate, 299 Pa. 452, 149 Atl. 705 (1930); Higgs v.
Bigelow, 39 S.D. 359, 164 N.W. 89 (1917). "And even though no request is
made for the performance of work or service, if it is known that it is being
rendered with the expectation of pay, the person benefitted is liable. It is a
question of fact if services are accepted whether a reasonable man in the
position of the parties would understand that they are offered in return for
a fair compensation, or would rather suppose either that they are offered
gratuitously, or if not, that the recipient might think so." 1 WLrLISTON, CONTRACTS § 36 (rev. ed. 1936). "Of course, it does not matter whether the defendant expected to pay for the services or not, the question is as to the
natural import of his overt acts.... Again, it is not necessary that the defendant should have believed that the plaintiff expected pay. If as a reasonable
man he should have understood from what he knew that such was the expectation, he would be bound by accepting the services." Per Justice Holmes in
Spencer v. Spencer, 181 Mass. 471, 63 N.E. 947, 948 (1902).

149. Israel v. Baker, 172 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1948); Chase v. Corcoran, 106
Mass. 286 (1871); Karon v. Kellogg, 195 Minn. 134, 261 N.W. 861 (1935).

150. Carlson v. Krantz, 172 Minn. 242, 214 N.W. 928 (1927); Anderson v.
Distiler, 173 Misc. 261, 17 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1940); Frain v. Brady, 48
R.I. 24, 134 Atl. 645 (1926). See Annot., 54 A.L.R. 548 (1928), for a good
collection of cases dealing with the various facets of the problem. See also
Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 8 (1949), for an exhaustive collection of cases on the subject dealing with the recovery for services renderd by member of household
or family, other than spouse, without express agreement for compensation.
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Also, it will be seen that there can be no recovery in quasi contract
if plaintiff acted officiously, that is, if he was a "volunteer," even if
plaintiff conferred a benefit upon the defendant. 151 The Restatement
of Restitution uses the term officiousness to describe such conduct. 152
In quasi contractual suits, however, the defendant's knowledge or
15 3
consent to the plaintiff's performance is not necessary for recovery.
Neither the officiousness of the plaintiff, nor the fact that plaintiff
conferred no benefit on defendant would seem to be relevant in a
claim for implied contract.
While the case at hand is a close one on the facts, the court seems
properly to have held that it was a jury question as to whether plaintiff did gratuitously confer those services on defendant for eleven
years. Since the jury answered the query in favor of plaintiff, that
properly ended this facet of the case.
Application of Statute of Limitations to Contract for Services for
Indefinite Period: In Murray v. Grissim the second defense interposed by defendant-the statute of limitations-also presented a very
close question, as is shown by the vigorous opinions, both the majority
by Judge Felts and the dissenting opinion by Judge Shriver, who
thought the six-year statute of limitations barred all of plaintiff's
claim for services performed more than six years before plaintiff's
suit was instituted. The pivotal point here, of course, is when did
plaintiff's cause of action accrue so as to start the statute running.
Both the dissent and the majority agreed that this issue turned on a
construction of the contract.
The majority of the court thought that plaintiff's services were
continuous and were rendered under one entire contract, and that
the cause of action did not accrue and the statute did not start to run,
until plaintiff's services were completed or terminated. Since plaintiff
managed the farm until it was sold in August 1952, which was less
than six years before suit was started, the majority of the court
thought none of the claim was barred. The dissent felt that since
plaintiff valued his services at $200 per month, he had put himself
on a monthly basis, or that the court should take judicial notice that
contracts for the conduct of farming operations are customarily from
151. Braun v. Hamack, 206 Minn. 572, 289 N.W. 553 (1940) (strong dissent
said plaintiff was not a volunteer in this case); Anderson v. Distiler, 173 Misc.

261, 17 N.Y.S.2d 674 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
152. RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 113-17 (1937).
153. See RESTATEMENT, RESTITUTION §§ 113-17 (1937); 1 CORBIN, CONTRACTS
§ 19 (1950). A typical situation is where a husband or parent improperly fails
to provide support for a wife or minor child. A third party who, though not
requested by the parent or husband, furnishes the support may recover the
reasonable value thereof in quasi contract. Porter v. Powell, 79 Iowa 151,
44 N.W. 295 (1890); Carr v. Anderson, 154 Minn. 162, 191 N.W. 407 (1923).
See Greenspan v. Slate, 12 N.J. 426, 97 A.2d 390, 397, 399 (1953); RESTATEMENT,
RESTITUTION

§§

113-14 (1937).
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year to year. In any event, the dissent seemed to think, plaintiff's
contract was severable, either on a monthly or yearly basis, and the
statute, at least, should begin to run either at the end of each month
or at the end of each year.
Although the dissenting judge purported to disagree with the
majority only as to the applicability of the statute of limitations to a
portion of plaintiff's claim, nevertheless he devoted considerable
space and forceful efforts to the thesis that plaintiff's claim should
be denied in entirety. He was of the opinion that plaintiff's claim was
only an afterthought.
In trying to decide whether a portion of plaintiff's claim is barred
by the six-year statute of limitations, we should recognize at the outset,
as does the majority, that there is a wide-open split of authority concerning the running of the statute of limitations against a claim for
services rendered over an extended period under indefinite employment where no time for payment is fixed.
In resolving the matter, first of all a construction must be put
upon the agreement, in order to determine whether the law regards
the employment by the week, the month, or other specified period,
or simply at will. 54 If it is determined that the employment is for
a specified period, then the statute of limitations will begin to run
when the employee has a right to compensation. 155 Where the agreement is construed as one continuing merely at the will of each party,
there the courts are sharply split in at least three ways on the question as to when the statute of limitations starts to run.
Where services are continuously rendered over an extended period
of time, under either an express or implied contract which does not
fix the term of employment nor the time when compensation shall be
payable, perhaps the prevailing view of the courts from a numerical
standpoint has treated the contract as an entire one and the statute of
limitations does not begin to run against the employee's claim for
compensation until the employment is ended. 5 6 This view, of course,
154. 6 WILLSTON, CONTRACTS
155. 6 id. §§ 2024, 2029.

§ 2029 (rev. ed. 1938).

156. Israel v. Baker, 172 F.2d 63 (10th Cir. 1948) (applying Oklahoma law).
Here services had been rendered over a period of thirty-one years. Plaintiff
was allowed a recovery on quasi contract, and it was held that the three-year
statute of limitations did not bar any of the claim. Additional cases following
this view are: Lalley v. Escoett, 146 F.2d 667 (D.C. Cir. 1945); Hubbard v.
Ball, 59 Idaho 78, 81 P.2d 73 (1938); Crampton v. Logan, 28 Ind. App. 405, 63
N.E. 51 (1902); Sullenbarger v. Ahrens, 168 Iowa 288, 150 N.W. 71 (1914);
Grisham v. Lee, 61 Kan. 533, 60 Pac. 312 (1900); Carter v. Carter, 36 Mich. 207
(1877); McCully v. McCully, 175 Miss. 876, 168 So. 608 (1936); Officer v. Cummings, 127 Ore. 320, 272 Pac. 273 (1928); Gulbranson v. Thompson, 63 Utah
115, 222 Pac. 590 (1924); Morrissey v. Faucett, 28 Wash. 52, 68 Pac. 352 (1902);
cf. Czelusniak v. Ossolinski, 273 Mass. 441, 173 N.E. 590 (1930). Tennessee
apparently was in this camp before the case at hand. See Walker v. Walker,
12 Tenn. App. 130, 140 (E.S. 1930).
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is the one adopted by the majority in deciding Murray v. Grissim.
Where the contract of employment is regarded as entire, even though
there is a stated or customary time of periodic payments, the statute
of limitations is not put into operation from such periodic dates, under
this prevailing view, but only from the termination of the employment.15 7
In some instances the statute of limitations against a claim for
services rendered without agreement as to a specific term of employment or time for compensation, has not started to run until the
termination of the employment, if the claims can be treated as items
in an account between the parties against which the statute would not
start to run until the entry of the last item. 5 8 That view could be
applied in Murray v. Grissim as to that period of time after the parties
had their partnership transaction in the horse business.
Where the period of services rendered is greater than the statutory
period before suit is started it can logically be argued, as does Judge
Shriver in his dissent in the case at hand, that part of the claim should
be barred by the statute. Nevertheless Mr. Williston offers a practical
reason why the statute is not put into operation until the termination
of the employment. He suggests that where the contract fails to fix
a precise time of payment, it may throw an unfair burden on the
employee if he is compelled at his peril to determine the exact moment
when he has a right of action. 159 Hence, he feels that this may constitute a reason why many jurisdictions take the position that the
statute of limitations will not begin to run until the termination of
the employee's performance under a contract for continuous indeterminative services, even though there is a stated or customary time
for periodic payments.
There are jurisdictions that are of a different persuasion, however,
where the services are continuously rendered over a considerable
period of time. In such circumstances, several courts are of the view
that in the absence of any facts showing the actual intent of the parties, or of a custom or usage governing the particular type of employment, it will be implied that the parties contemplated the payment
of wages at periodic intervals, monthly or annually, so that the
statute of limitations will begin to run from the end of the period,
157. See, e.g., Schaffner v. Schaffner's Estate, 98 Kan. 167, 157 Pac. 402
(1916); Grisham v. Lee, 61 Kan. 533, 60 Pac. 312 (1900); see 6 WILLISTON,

CONTRACTS § 2029 (rev. ed. 1938).

158. McCarthy v. Paris, 46 Idaho 165, 267 Pac. 232 (1928); McGrew's Ex'r v.
Congleton, 139 Ky. 515, 102 S.W. 1185 (1907); Vincent v. Palmer, 179 Md. 365,
19 A.2d 183 (1941); Greenwood v. Judson, 109 App. Div. 398, 96 N.Y.Supp. 147
(4th Dep't 1905); Trethewey v. Green River Gorge, Inc., 17 Wash.2d 697, 136
P.2d 999 (1943); Hay v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 45 Pac. 1073 (1896). Tennessee
has applied this rule. Weatherhead v. Boyers, 15 Tenn. 359 (1835).
159. See 6 WILmSTON, CONTRACTS

§ 2029 (rev. ed. 1938).
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whatever it may be, in which the employee performed the services.
Consequently, no recovery can be had under this view for services

performed where the end of the implied periodic interval is more
than the statutory period before suit is started. 160 Judge Shriver does

some thinking along these lines in his dissenting opinion.
Still other courts permit the statute of limitations to bite even

deeper into the employee's claim for compensation. For services
rendered continuously over a long period of time without agreement
as to when the compensation should be payable, these courts have

refused to imply any agreement for the postponement of the payment,
holding that the statute begins to run immediately upon the performance of each individual act of service. Thus, under this view claims

for all services performed more than the statutory period before
suit is started are barred. 161 This view seems to represent the conclusion of the dissenting Judge Shriver in Murray v. Grissim.
In the case at hand, there were at least three choices the court could
have made with respect to when the statute of limitations started to
run on plaintiff's claim for services rendered over a period of eleven
years of indefinite employment and without any time for payments
being fixed. It could have found that the statute started to run (a) at
the termination of the employment, or (b) at periodic intervals
implied by the court, or (c) at the time of the rendition of each
individual act of service. The majority of the court adopted the
view that the statute does not start to run until the termination of
the employment. This is perhaps the prevailing view and the view
which seems to be preferred by Mr. Williston, the leading authority in
the field of contract law. The dissenting judge thought the statute
should bar plaintiff's recovery for all services performed more than
the statutory period of six years before the suit was started. The positions of both the majority of the court and the dissenting judge are
well buttressed by an abundance of authority from highly regarded
courts.

1 62

160. Ennis v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 165 Ill. 161, 46 N.E. 439 (1896); In re
Gardner, 103 N.Y. 533, 9 N.E. 306 (1886); In re Chafee's Estate, 122 IMisc. 768,
204 N.Y.Supp. 765 (Surr. Ct. 1924); In re Koonce's Estate, 105 Pa. Super. 539,
161 Atl. 578 (1932). See Hotsinpiller v. Hotsinpiller, 72 W. Va. 823, 79 S.E. 936

(1913).

At least some courts of this persuasion will postpone the operation

of the statute if the facts show an account between the parties, against which
the statute of limitations will not run until the entry of the last item of

account. Smith v. Velie, 60 N.Y. 106 (1875); Greenwood v. Judson, 109 App.

Div. 398, 96 N.Y.Supp. 147 (4th Dep't 1905). In this connection, see also Hay
v. Peterson, 6 Wyo. 419, 45 Pac. 1073 (1896).

161. Dempsey v. McNabb, 73 Md. 433, 21 Atl. 378 (1891); Grady v. Faison,
224 N.C. 567, 31 S.E.2d 760 (1944); Scott v. Walker, 141 Tex. 181, 170 S.W.2d
718 (1943). But cf. lims' Ex'rs v. Sturtevant, 18 Ala. 359 (1850); Vincent v.
Palmer, 179 Md. 365, 19 A.2d 183 (1941).
162. For collection of cases on the various views, see Annot., 7 A.L.R.2d 198
(1949).

